LETTER

TO THE

RIGHT HON. BENJAMIN DISRAELI, M.P.

ON THE

PRESENT RELATIONS OF

ENGLAND WITH THE COLONIES.

BY

THE RIGHT HON. C. B. ADDERLEY, M.P.

WITH

AN APPENDIX

OF EXTRACTS FROM EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON COLONIAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 1861.

LONDON:
EDWARD STANFORD, 6, CHARING CROSS, S.W.

LETTER, &c.

DEAR DISRAELI,

I address myself to you, in writing on the subject of our present colonial relations, not only because you are the Leader of the political party to which I belong in the House of Commons, but still more because you are the last leading Statesman there, who has openly shown a due appreciation of the naked and disastrous truth—to which I am anxious to draw attention,—that England has lost the right estimation of her special art, and vital interest in colonization; and has substituted for her former national offspring, a semi-dependency, looking to her for protection, instead of sharing with her in universal empire.

We became aware, late last session, that Her Majesty had engaged the service of the largest steamer in the world, to convey additional forces from home to Canada, which we were told was agitated by the first sound of civil strife across its borders. Lord Palmerston vented his most heroic indignation against Sir James Fergusson, who remonstrated against this forestallment of assistance. Nothing but ignorance of the history of our Colonies could have enabled the Premier to adopt the *civis Romanus* tone in his defence of a proceeding which, if he knew anything of the spirit of our Colonies in former times, must have indicated a conviction in his mind of the degeneracy of his countrymen. You replied by the counter question, "Are there no inhabitants in Canada—are there "not a numerous and gallant people there? If not adequate, "on this occasion to depend wholly on their own energies, do "they require our men to set them the first example? Taking "so early an opportunity of letting the Canadians know that "we are prepared to assume the monopoly of their defence is

"calculated to damp their ardour, and make them feel that it "is not their business to protect their hearths and homes and "national honour. The transmission of 3,000 troops cannot be "meant as an adequate means for baffling an invasion of Canada. "If there is suspicion in the minds of the Government of a "misunderstanding with the United States, it cannot be politic "to intimate that opinion by taking inadequate means of vin- "dicating the honour of this country." The present conjuncture of affairs only adds force to your reply. If the time is near when the strength of the empire must be brought to their support, doubly requisite is it that the Colonists should have put forth their own strength. Even though it should prove to have been a happy accident that a detachment of English troops anticipated a quarrel of our own in America arising in a season impracticable for transport, nevertheless, the mischief of our undertaking the primary responsibility for the defence of Canada appears clearly, above any such advantage, by the fact that Canada has but 30,000 ill-trained militia ready, which, moreover, we have to arm, for her own defence. She would have had 200,000 but for our garrisons.

I spent my first ten years of Parliamentary life in co-operation with the men who succeeded, against an opposition which rendered the legislation imperfect, in restoring self-government to the Colonies, but without its correlative responsibilities. The result has been, in many cases, the production of an unprecedented anomaly—the freest possible government, responsible to legislatures based on universal suffrage; yet equipped with the sinews of war, in some cases the means of internal police, and part of the cost of civil establishments from another community, in the distant centre of the empire. Complete democracy impels these Colonial Ministries in their course of local policy, while supplies from another quarter enable them to deal with wars, and tumults, and even with governmental opposition without reference to the people; having their defence provided, and the needful costs defrayed by an all-sufficient proxy. The Colonies asked for the control of

their own taxation: we gave them the use of a good deal of our own besides. On the other hand, while we gave them self-government enough to enable them freely to direct their own affairs, we retained enough of the theory of protecting them to render them irresponsible for the consequences of their own actions, or the security of their own interests.

We cannot trust to the mere economists of the House of Commons to disembarrass us of this confusion. If they would take the subject in hand even in its least important aspect—the heavy burden inflicted on our tax-payers without a shadow of compensatory benefit to any one—we might wait in expectation of some help from them. But though Mr. Bright tells the people of Birmingham every year that the House of Commons, as now constituted, is lavish and wasteful, especially in military expenditure, yet he balances the weight of his theoretic grievance by an abstinence from action, which gives a practical sanction to it. His uniform absence from the House of Commons on supply nights is a fair composition with ministers for his tirades in town-halls against their extravagance. His silence in their presence gives consent to all their yearly squanderings on useless colonial fortifications, and on the perpetual transport of our troops wasting their strength in scattered detachments, preventing all the rest of the empire from drawing out its own resources, and needlessly burdening ours.

If I look to the present occupants of the treasury bench, I see there a Minister of first-rate ability, in charge of the Exchequer, thoroughly conversant with colonial questions, in all respects most eminently qualified to deal with this subject. His masterly treatment of it in his evidence before Mr. Arthur Mills's late Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, furnishes me with my best materials in writing to you. But I derive no hope from all his knowledge, and all his ability, while he continues to lament over our growing national expenditure, and only points his moral with this repeated illustration.

Allow me, then, to profess publicly my own expectations as resting solely on yourself. I feel assured of your grappling with the subject, and acknowledging its immense importance. I am confident, this being the case, that you will neither treat it rashly, nor neglect it. The interests of the Crown in a great colonial empire will not be trifled with by you. The hazard to these interests resulting from unsound colonial relations, enervating the colonies, and diminishing the aggregate power of the empire, you will keenly discern. You have a parliamentary following which will enable you to give effect to awakening public opinion, and restrain it from the rash haste to which a sudden vision of such public mischief might be likely to impel it.

1.—Only two possible Colonial Relations.

There are only two essentially distinct principles of relationship between a mother country and colonies: the one, that of subserviency and dependence, the other of community and partnership.

On the first principle the mother country treats a colony as a dependency, to be made conducive to her own interests, and entitled to her protection: on the other, an equality of rights and duties is mutually recognized as between the citizens of a common empire.

It is useless to ransack the records of antiquity, or those of contemporary nations, for illustrations of colonial relations. Manners, and the structure of society differ so essentially, that we arrive at this fundamental distinction before any feature presents itself for useful comparison, or example.

The Greek Colonies most nearly resembled our own in the principle of their first foundation, and the relation of alliance which they maintained with the mother country: and like ours, their rapidity of growth to wealth and greatness, from the first moment of their release from home, exceeded all other instances of national increase. But whatever the difference

of type may be between a Tyrian, Roman, Grecian, Venetian, Spanish, English, or Dutch Colony, whether in its origin, structure, growth, or idea, the colonies of all times and nations range themselves under one or other of the alternative principles of relationship with their mother country, as long as they maintain any connexion at all, namely, that of subserviency and dependence, or that of community and partnership.

2.—Community of Citizenship is the True Principle of British Colonization.

Clark, our chief authority on Colonial Law, lays down a triple classification of English Colonies according to their mode of acquisition, (*Summary of Colonial Law*, p. 4,) whether by conquest, by cession, or by occupancy. The first and second classes he considers to be dominions of the Crown, until the right of self-government be conceded to them, which concession can never be revoked. The third class are English communities, with all the rights and liabilities of English citizens from the outset, as much as if they were detached pieces of this island floated off on the distant ocean.

It matters little now what was the origin of any of our Colonies, whether conquered by force of our arms, as Jamaica; or of our colonists' arms, as Nova Scotia; or of both united, as Canada; or ceded to us by any treaty; or first occupied by us for commerce. As every Colony, properly so called, has had self-government conceded to it, we need not search now for charters, or records, to ascertain the original character of any. England may assume superiority, and volunteer her patronage, but the legitimate rights and responsibilities of all her colonists are to be studied in the constitution of her citizens at home.

Our true colonial relations are, as I hold, the relations naturally existing between one part of England and another, modified only by a greater distance from the metropolis; the distance being so great as to necessitate separate establishments.

English Colonies, gifted with self-government, are offset communities of the English type, just as Tyrian Colonies were Tyrian; and Greek Greek; as grown-up sons resemble parents; and their households resemble the parental home; unless by unnatural treatment, denial of rights, selfish usurpation, or oppression by force or fraud, they have lost their natural character, become alienated from their natural affinities, or incurred the stamp of slaves; or else, by the equal injury of over-patronage, become crippled or emasculated.

Offspring nations naturally tend to stronger development of the parental characteristics. In the fresh and open field of America, the free genius of our race expanded in still freer institutions, while a more despotic government prevailed in the neighbouring dominions of France, than her ministers could ever establish at home. The English more eagerly fastened on the sea-coasts, and devoted themselves to enterprise; the French more fastidiously sought the interior and the rivers, and were intent on military occupation. That is the best government, which gives scope to the best qualities of the governed. English Colonies inherit the noblest faculties for freedom; and if Mr. Mill rightly describes representative institutions as the true tendency and the natural composition of free citizenship; and the self-reliant, vigorous character of our race as specially fitted for them; what violence it must be to our colonial instincts, to choke the natural channels of self-action, or to encumber them with extraneous help! What poison to English vitality must be the first acquired sense of dependence, especially to our countrymen whose emigration has only indicated an exuberance of national spirit refusing to be pent up at home!

What hope of any permanent success can attend such repressive colonial policy? Reduce a British Colony to habits of the most abject dependence—furnish it with every local requirement from its governor to its police—let money, drawn from English taxation, flow through every channel of its internal administration, until every feature of self-govern-

ment becomes fictitious, and every spring of action corrupt—still, through the lowest process of decomposition, the *vis naturæ* will sprout forth again. Freemen cannot live long on crumbs from a master's table. The natural spirit of Englishmen is too high to let go their birthright for the wages of protection: their self-reliance too innate to become obliterated by any culture.

If anything more than the supremacy of the Crown is to be set over colonial communities, if England desires to act as a superior nation over them, they should not be allowed the forms of freedom—representative institutions—for through those forms the intended inferior must rise to real equality with the ideal superior.

Despotism, congenial with Asiatic people, serves also to retain their incapacity for freedom, and obstructs the possible approaches of freedom.

But our American, African, and Australian Colonies, naturally free, have also representative institutions, and the representative of the Crown on the spot. They are complete transmarine Englands. They have all the equipment of English self-government, only in separate establishments, because their distance renders their representation in Westminster impossible. It is but creating confusion to give them entire nationality, and supply them with an external government besides.

We at once see that community, not subserviency, is the principle of their relation to us. They have the control of supplies for their own executive; and such power includes, of course, responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs. The rights of self-control they must necessarily forego, in proportion as their own establishments are not supported by themselves. The idea of self-government involves that of self-sufficiency. The Colonies may, indeed, expect the forces of the empire to rally round them at need, and they must be expected to rally round the imperial standard themselves when needed. But the one is no more to be expected than the other. Community cannot be one-sided. The Colonies

cannot take the privileges, and leave to England the duties of freedom. The rights of freedom, to use Mr. Gladstone's words (*Evid.* 3,781), entail its duties also, and the one cannot long be possessed without the other; and, in Mr. Mill's words, it is exactly in proportion as a man has more or less to do for his country, that he becomes attached more or less as a free citizen to it. (J. S. Mill, *On Representative Government.*) A free country undertaken for by another, is not really free. It is for the interest of England's Colonies, more than for her own, that they should lose none of the exercises of citizenship in their separation from the home country, of its labours any more than of its enjoyments.

3.—Common Citizenship was the Relation between England and her first Colonies; and they separated in consequence of its Violation.

It would be impossible to assert, and absurd to suppose it likely, that this healthy colonial relationship and condition had ever been fully realized for any length of time. Nothing in this world's history takes its natural course unimpeded by crossing currents or obstructions. But the early American Settlements of the 16th and 17th centuries had at least documentary recognition, from their first going out, of "a right to "the same conditions of citizenship as if they had remained "at home," and they always asserted it.

Queen Elizabeth's first patent, granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, guaranteed to her subjects who went out with him to Virginia, "all the rights of free denizens of England." But as much as any Queen she loved management, and those to whom she delegated her power, loved it no less.

James I. indulged his legislative fancy in drawing charters for colonial government, and codes of laws for the Companies to whom he dealt out the American Continent.

Grahame remarks the inconsistency of this kingly legislation, with his invariable "reservation to the colonists and their

"children, of the same liberties and privileges as they would have "in England." (*Hist. of United States*, Book I., chap. i., p. 35.) The ascription of legislative power to the sovereign, might have agreed very well with such a reservation in a Colony of Spain, whose royal councils, and audiencias administered at Madrid as much, or as little liberty and justice to distant colonists as to Spaniards at home. But the Anglo-American Colonies speedily vindicated their national rights as Englishmen, nor did that constitutional spirit of independence, or of self-dependence, terminate in separation from England—nor the almost invincible attachment which it created finally give way—until the revival of interference under a more obstinate king than James I. tested the greater strength of their confirmed liberty.

Mr. Roebuck (in his *Colonies of England*) shows how they all prospered in exact proportion to their acquisition of civil rights and interests; nor did any of those Colonies, so various in origin, so constant to freedom, fail, even in the first enterprise, except Virginia, which at first languished, and nearly expired, when treated as the subject of a London Company—the gift of a king—the plaything of adventurers.

The London Company then assumed towards the Colonies very much the position of the Colonial Office a few years ago. The Colonies under it were constantly in trouble, the blame and care of which they always laid at its door, with the same helpless bitterness with which a Frenchman curses the Minister at Paris for all his misfortunes.

Chalmers, whose prejudices were in favour of the Home Government, is obliged to confess (*Polit. Ann.*, Book I., chap. iii., p. 63,) that "the length of Virginia's infancy, the miseries of "its youth, the disasters of its riper years, might all be at-"tributed to this monstrous government. The Assembly of "Virginia, after it had tasted the sweets of a simple govern-"ment, opposed with firm spirit all attempts to revive the "patents. They then exerted their own talents to discover "remedies. Nothing was wanting to establish their prosperity

"but unqualified permission to manage their own affairs. "They displayed a vigour in design and action, which men, "when left to themselves amid dangers, never fail to exert." Released from protection, they fortified themselves against the Indians, and even undertook enterprises against the French Port Royal, and the Dutch Settlement of New York. James, wishing to flatter their Assembly on the dissolution of the Company, offered them military aid; but they declined it, unless placed under the control of their Governor, and paid by the votes of their own Assembly.

Unlike our recent Colonists they undertook the survey of their own country, and so well, that their original plans have only been expanded as the Colony has grown. With their own legislature and administration, free as their fellow-countrymen at home, they became so loyal to the British Crown, that in that part of the empire alone Royalty suffered no eclipse, but reflected thence its outskirt rays, until, the home rebellion having cleared away, it shone forth on all again.

The Navigation Act at the Restoration was a trial of their loyalty. They murmured that it was a violation of their rights, inflicted by a Parliament in which they were not represented. They rebelled; and for the first time, regular troops from England were quartered on them, at their expense, to suppress, not to protect their rights.

The first permanent settlement of New England was effected by Independents flying from the ecclesiastical tyranny of James I., who nevertheless connived at their establishing themselves in America as a body politic, with a free constitution.

Charles I., eager to rid himself of Puritans, gave a charter to a second body of emigrants (*Charters of American Colonies*), who founded Massachusetts, having a legislature to themselves as freemen, "entitled to all the rights of home-born subjects of England." Instantly on this assurance of autonomy, numbers flocked there, and founded Boston; and evinced still greater vigour by throwing out offset colonies, such as Connecticut, each providing in every respect for its own requirements.

This first colonial grandson of England, within a year of its birth, defeated, by its own unaided power, the Pequod and Naraganset tribes combined against it under the famous Chief Sassacus,—burnt their fortifications—in short, did everything that New Zealand, after forty years' settlement, has lately proved itself incompetent to do against Maori tribes with the aid of British troops.

It was amid struggles such as these, that Massachusetts found time and means to found Harvard College—such is the living spring of home resources, compared with the languor of a distant supply. These were real colonies—not dependencies—consisting of real Englishmen, only settled in America.

Charles I. had been alarmed at the vigour of English liberty; planted out, as he had intended, for riddance. He tried to stop the emigration, and so kept near himself, Hampden, Pym, and Cromwell, who no doubt would have contributed to the same liberty abroad, which they afterwards promoted so much at home.

When the Indians, in terror of English progress, formed a general confederacy against the Colonists, a corresponding union of colonial self-defence was formed against them. In every war after 1643, each Colony furnished its stipulated quota of men, money, and provisions, at a rate proportioned to its population.

After the Restoration, Charles II. attempted to control this colonial union; but they met his attempt by a "Declaration of Rights," (Grahame, Book II., chap. iii., p. 309,) in which they asserted that the provincial governments were "entitled "by every means, even by force of arms, to defend themselves "both by land and sea, against all who should attempt injury "to the provinces or their inhabitants," an assertion which has since changed into that of a right to be protected by England.

In the treaty of Breda, Charles II. restored Cromwell's conquest of Acadie to the French, whom the Indians therefore concluded to be in the ascendant. The Indians instantly

renewed their combination against the New England States. A fierce native war lasted a whole year. At length, the steady efforts and invincible courage of the Colonists prevailed. No praise, however, did they get from Charles for this repulse of hostilities, wholly occasioned by imperial policy; but only reproach for their "seditious obstinacy in refusing to solicit "assistance from their king, and for sordid parsimony in the "equipment of their own levies;" (Grahame, Book II., chap. iv., p. 344, and Evelyn's *Diary;*) by which, he said, they had protracted the war, and proved themselves unfit to be trusted with the government of the country. Charles was proceeding to revoke the charters of New England when he died, 1685. Halifax had, indeed, remonstrated; urging that, as English Colonists, the New Englanders were entitled to the same laws and institutions as were established in England: and upon James II. putting them under the government of a Commission, the Crown lawyers, and in particular Sir William Jones, gave an official opinion that, notwithstanding the forfeiture of their Charter, the inhabitants continued English subjects invested with English liberties, and, consequently, that the king could no more levy money on them without their consent in an Assembly, than they could discharge themselves from their allegiance. The Royal institutions were, however, says Grahame, (I., 367,) good in themselves: and amongst them we find the direction "to "discipline and arm themselves for the defence of their own "country." The Stuart king asked his Colonies to undertake the duties, and leave to him all the rights of their government. We now give Colonies all the rights, and charge ourselves with the duties of their government.

Our Revolution brought us into war with the French, who immediately set the Indians again in combination against our Colonies. Massachusetts instantly armed, reconquered Acadie for the British Crown, 1689, and proceeded to apply to William III. for aid to invade Canada; which he refused to do, on the ground of having work enough for his troops in Europe. The New Englanders advanced to the attempt alone, and this enter-

prise was undertaken by them heroically, though unsuccessfully, only sixty years after their first settlement in America.

William III. sought to retain the advantage taken by James against the Charters; but the people of Massachusetts repeated the declaration of their right to representative government, always acknowledging the supremacy of the King. In his name they built and garrisoned forts along their frontier. When in 1695 they lost Acadie again, and their own Fort Pemmaquid was stormed and taken by a joint French and Indian attack, by land and sea, under Count Frontignac, their defence was a gallant one, and only the Peace of Ryswick stopped their renewed advance.

But I have heard some men allow that all this is true enough of the New England Colonies, but that no such spirit was shown by their Southern contemporaries; so completely has one of the proudest pages of our national history been forgotten. Let us then look into the annals of a Southern territory, which was given by a Stuart King to a Roman Catholic Peer, as Proprietor, with the intention of its being an asylum for Papists, and for martyrs to Royal supremacy. Surely if freedom and self-dependence found no impediment to their establishment in such a settlement as Maryland, there can be no excuse for their absence anywhere. Yet, here, Charles I. only granted to Lord Baltimore power to make laws with the assent of the freemen, or their representatives in Assembly; all the settlers were recognized as freemen, entitled to the same liberties as native-born Englishmen; and to the Proprietor, as Prince Palatine, was delegated the Royal authority to command them to act under his local orders in their own defence, "to repel invasion, and to suppress rebellions." (Bozman's *Hist. of Maryland.*) Not many years after its foundation we read of Maryland imposing a tax on its own exports to maintain a magazine of arms.

Among the troubled days of civil and religious warfare, these early Colonies were perpetually involved in both the internal and external struggles of the parent state; yet not

less in those than in their own local disturbances they bore the part which fell to them without fear or question. The convulsions of England spread their agitations to the extremities of the empire; and foreign enemies, so stirred up, often made a colony their first battle-field. Yet this was not considered any reason for their means of defence, in men or money, being sent to them from England.

England broke up the Peace of Ryswick, 1702, to prevent France from seizing the Spanish succession. French hostility instantly operated in America, stirring up the Indians to renewed conspiracies. The Colonies combined for their defence against this English war, without any help from England. They asked, indeed, for co-operation in a second invasion of Canada. Again assistance was promised, but failed to arrive, being detained by disasters in Spain; and the colonial militia alone attacked Port Royal, garrisoned by French regulars; but their power was unequal to their high spirit, and they were again unsuccessful. Upon this disaster, Queen Anne assured them of reinforcements, and fixed the contribution of each Colony for a renewed enterprise. The Colonies sent addresses of thanks, and largely exceeded their stipulated quota of men. The combined army assembled; but again the English withdrew to meet European pressure at home; again the Colonists advanced alone, and finally themselves added Port Royal and Acadie to the dominions of the British Crown.

At the same time, a combined force of Indians attacked North Carolina, whose first warning was a night massacre of 137 inhabitants. The settlers rallied, and kept the Indians in check till succours came of men and money from South Carolina, with which intercolonial assistance, they repelled the invasion.

The Indians then attacked South Carolina, which, in its exhaustion, asked aid from England. The request was disregarded, and the militia proved sufficient alone.

The militia of New England in 1730 numbered 50,000 men, regularly drilled and organized.

It is remarkable that even the body of insolvent debtors

who were sent out from English prisons in 1732 to found Georgia,—the last of this group of Colonies,—were previously to their going out regularly trained as soldiers, and, on their arrival, formed into an organized militia. They were not only expected ordinarily to defend themselves, but were expressly meant to act as a barrier between the other Colonies and the Spanish in Florida; and the English Parliament voted for this, their own undertaking, only a few thousand pounds in part payment for some of the first forts to be erected.

On this settlement being made, France lost no time in joining her forces with those of Spain to invade both Georgia and Carolina; and the militia of those two provinces, aided by some friendly Indians, repulsed them.

Some Moravians, who came with the first settlers to Georgia, had stipulated with the English Government on religious grounds for exemption from military service; but so indignant were the rest of the community at any such exemption existing when war came on, that the Moravians were compelled to leave the Colony. Even Quaker Pennsylvania came at last to a formal vote that defensive war was lawful, and formed themselves into an organized militia.

Georgia greatly contributed to the resolution of the English Parliament for the war with Spain, which was fatal to Walpole's Ministry. One English regiment was then sent out to them, *and placed under Georgian command;* and with the hearty co-operation, in men and money, of Virginia and Carolina, an united invasion of Florida was made.

When the Austrian succession war drew France as well as Spain into hostilities with England, 1744, the English Colonists successfully defended Annapolis against the first attack; and, in return, carrying the war into the enemy's country, they took Louisburg, which was called the Gibraltar of America, and subjected Cape Breton altogether to the British Crown.

For this great expedition the Colonists furnished the naval as well as military equipment—arming twelve of their own

war sloops, and hiring two privateers. Their land force was commanded by Pepperel, a Colonel of the Massachusetts militia, and consisted of men of all classes, including many freeholders, thriving farmers, and substantial tradesmen—a sort of colonist now thought too valuable to defend themselves, though unable to pay for their own defence.

Their task was the reduction of a regular fortress, garrisoned by disciplined troops of France, and their only assistance was the accidental co-operation, late in the action, of Commodore Warren's squadron.

England was then much occupied at home by the Scotch Rebellion, and European war; but on Louis XV. threatening great revenge for the loss of Louisburg, she promised her Colonies some assistance for the defence of the new possessions which they had gained for her: and remitted some money towards the costs they had already incurred. She, however, required a large colonial force to be got ready.

It was fortunate she did, for her promised assistance never came; but the habitual self-reliance of New England was equal to the emergency. 6,400 militia from Massachusetts, and 6,000 from Connecticut, joined the troops already mustered, and new forts and batteries were erected along the coast. D'Anville, disheartened, forbore to attack.

All this while Nova Scotia, the basis of English operations, had been, from its French origin and sympathy, hourly expected to revolt. The Colonists, also, had a great disadvantage from confusion of counsels. The Provincial Governors, each controlled by independent Assemblies, often had to confer military command on popular adherents. Their enemy had a regular army, and their country was under the undivided sway of military government.

In this imperial war about their frontiers, the Colonists incurred a heavy loss of men and money, yet the only question raised about it, related to the apportionment of their several contributions; and they refused not to pay their quota to the expenses of Anson's fleet. They resisted, indeed, an attempt

to impress their men for the British navy; but, in doing so, they did no more than England herself, soon after, did at home; the press-gang being a relic of feudal service which the circumstances of colonies, and the modern notions at home alike repudiated.

We can scarcely imagine, in these days, the indignation of New England at the news of its recent conquests, Louisburg and Cape Breton, being restored to France, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in exchange for some equivalent given up by France to —— Austria! This it was that occasioned the first colonial demand for reimbursement; and the Statute of 21 Geo. II., c. 33, granted, on a graduated scale, repayments to each of the Colonies of part of their expenses in the late war. Such a payment was the converse of the remittances now sometimes made by colonies of a trifling contribution, or extra allowance, to the habitual expenses of England in defending them. It should also be observed that the same statute provided for a like indemnification to Sardinia, and other foreign allies. But it was the novelty of taxing the English at home, in aid of the English abroad, that suggested afterwards the idea of taxing colonists, in the English Parliament, for home service; a constitutional violence, which finally severed colonial allegiance, and which would also have struck at the root of English liberty at home, by providing the Government with extraneous supplies.

On this same occasion another novelty in colonization was introduced, by settling troops, disbanded at the Peace, amongst the disaffected French inhabitants of Nova Scotia: and for this purpose Parliament voted £40,000 a year for ten years. The scheme wholly failed, the settlement lingering only for a time, subsisting, much as Western Australia now does, on the expenditure of the military and naval forces maintained by the parent state, and not by its own resources.

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was soon ended by the renewed jealousies of France and England in America. Were the Colonists alone to sustain the ensuing war? England had

misgivings about their growing vigour, but she decided that they should undertake the opposition to the French in the first instance, reserving the question of partial reimbursement of their expenses. For so great an undertaking, the Colonists formed their first federation, and placed Washington at the head of their federal army. In his first operations, at the head of his Virginian militia alone, he was unsuccessful, and the British Government dispatched General Braddock to support him, and to raise levies on the spot; Parliament extending then, for the first time, the Mutiny Act to North America, 1758 (Grahame, III., 380).

It was the Seven Years' War, however, which first implicated English and Colonial forces avowedly in joint warfare. The Colonists gladly accepted the co-operation, but showed unwillingness to be taken out of their own provinces to fight, or to be engaged in wars, in voting supplies for which they had had no voice.

Franklin's writings vouch for these having been their sentiments, though so unlike the calculations of colonists now-a-days of economy through English protection.

They furnished whatever forces were required of them; and though they disputed the assertion that the Billeting Act extended to them, they removed all difficulty by passing an Act putting themselves under the same obligation, and rendering themselves liable to be recruited into the English regiments sent out to them. The authority, generally, of British statutes expressly applying to them, was rather submitted to than acknowledged by them, and was never allowed to extend to taxation.

Lord Chatham threw the whole vigour of his mind into this war, and put under General Abercrombie's command the largest army America had ever seen, of which 22,000 were English troops, and 28,000 Colonial.

It is well known that the first Pitt and Franklin had each his own different doubts as to the wisdom of American con-

quest. It was, however, undertaken, and ultimately accomplished by Wolfe, 1759.

Now began the question, whether the Colonies were to sustain equally with England the enormous levies of men, and the profuse expenditure of money involved in such foreign enterprise.

The Colonists were getting deeper in debt, and the English promises of reimbursement were slow and measured in performance.

This is the turning point of our colonial history. Quebec received a garrison of 5,000 English troops. Canada would certainly have been lost again, but for large reinforcements from England.

The war grew to a scale on which the two Principals were necessarily more engaged than their respective Colonies; and the conquest was completed by England over France.

At the completion of the war, many English officers and disbanded soldiers were settled in the Colonies.

England had become the sole power in America. Canada, which, at the Peace of Paris, 1762, she resolved, to the immense satisfaction of the Colonists, to retain, was placed under a government, the offices of which were chiefly conferred on the British military, or traders, to the great discontent of the French inhabitants.

Pitt called upon the Colonists to fortify Canada, which they did, and they garrisoned the forts. Unfortunately England also projected the permanent maintenance of a regular army in America, to be supported at the expense of the Colonists; and, for defraying the cost of their protection, the imposition of a tax on them by the enactment of the British Parliament. Mr. Grenville proposed a stamp-duty, but invited them to name any other they might prefer. Massachusetts answered, "It were better for them to endure injustice in "silence, than to purchase its instigation by recognizing its "principle. The English Parliament had no right to tax the

"Colonies. The King might inform them of the exigencies of "the public service, and they were ready to provide for them, "if required, in a constitutional manner. If they were taxed "in a Parliament in which they were not represented, they "were slaves to the Britons from whom they were descended." (Grahame, IV., 178-9.)

Franklin conceived a plan for their representation in the House of Commons. It was, no doubt, impracticable, yet had England only respected their rights of common citizenship, though the Americans might have grown out of all possible retention under a common allegiance, they would always have retained for us, from common origin, common interests, and commerce, a strong attachment as allies. Instead of this, our high-spirited first Colonies exhibit now, as foreign nations, a stronger friendship for uncongenial France, which helped them in their struggle, than for kindred England, from whom they preferred to separate rather than lose the constitutional independence which they derived from her.

4.—Contrast between present and former Colonial Relations.

Before I show how the spirit and condition of our Colonies, and the nature of their relations with this country, gradually deteriorated after the American disruption, I proceed at once to put in contrast with our first ideas of colonization, those which we have now arrived at. I will afterwards trace the process of deterioration.

Our Colonies at this time do not exhibit the lowest stage of the descending process, for they passed at one period entirely out of the relation of common citizenship with Englishmen into the inferior relation of dependence and subserviency. They had not even the self-action of an English municipality. (See Mr. Gladstone's magnificent *Speech on the New Zealand Government Bill*, Hansard, cxxi., 1852, p. 957.) They

halt now in a grotesque stage of half recovery. They have recovered so much of the rights which used to be recognized as inseparable from all English communities, as to have representative government.

New Zealand had so much of the British constitution granted to it in 1852. I count none of the caricatures of British Constitutions which amused the leisure of Colonial Ministers before. Little had the New Zealand Provinces, before that date, thriven as the old American Settlements throve with all their early struggles, excepting Canterbury, which founded itself in somewhat similar spirit to theirs. Auckland, for instance, languished, fed only on English supplies: and its population of 20,000 now little exceeds that of the recent settlement of Canterbury, 15,000; and one-fifth of all its population, 4,000, consists of troops sent from England, and paid by Englishmen. Lord Grey, in his *Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration*, condoles with his noble colleague on the interruption of peace in this Colony *during his administration.* The phrase is remarkable; showing the present theory to be, that the administration of this country includes the administration of the Colonies, though they have their own legislatures, and a viceroy, and ministry, on the spot, leaving properly but a scanty catalogue of Crown relations to be administered in Downing-street, and the more scanty the catalogue the better. He gives an account of the native rebellion there in 1845, and of the mission of Sir George Grey then, as now again, to put rebellion down; "whose energy," he says, "supported as it was both by troops and naval force" from England, "brought the insurrection to a close. The firmness and decision of Captain Laye, saved the country." (*Colon. Policy*, II. 115.) Charmed with this rescue of a helpless Colony from its own disturbance, he dwells on the consideration of the formidable character of the Natives, and paucity of the Colonists, as having enhanced the feat. But the

population of New Zealand at that time was twice as great as that of some of the Anglo-American Settlements when they were engaged, unaided, with far more formidable Natives, armed, disciplined, and assisted by the French. The Governor, Sir George Grey, in a despatch dated July 9, 1849, (*Colon. Policy*, II. 117,) commenting on the recent New Zealand rebellion, deprecates (one would have thought needlessly) any comparison between New Zealand and the early American Colonies. He refers to the authority of experienced officers to prove the superiority of Maori tribes to the North American Indians; and even to our own troops, in point of equipment for warfare in that sort of country. He extols the rapidity and secrecy of movement of the Maori natives; their courage, and their cunning in presenting no point for attack while always attacking; and their daring following of any leader. I wonder if he ever read of the Six Nations; of Cherokees sustaining long and doubtful campaigns; of Delawares invading three British provinces at once by combined movements, capturing several forts garrisoned by English, and with great difficulty and loss diverted from the siege of Pittsburg; of Braddock's army perishing by an unseen attack; of the great leader Sassacus in earlier times, against whom the new formed colony of Connecticut warred in siege and field; or of the terrible Pontiac in later times, whose terror roused the Pennsylvanian Quakers to arms, put to the proof the Virginian militia, and called into existence the celebrated border-riflemen. The secrecy with which these Indians planned their wars, and the vigilance and art with which they conducted them, are chronicled in the names of many distinguished victims.

The real difference between those times and these is not, as Sir G. Grey supposed, in the greater danger, or less means to meet danger, of our present Colonies, but in the mode in which danger was met, and the means of self-defence made use of. When, early in the progress of the North American Colonies, the united Indians threatened their existence, England

simply called on the Colonists to unite against their common danger. (Chalmers' *Polit. Ann.*, Book I.) On the conclusion of the Maori war of 1845, the Governor, Sir G. Grey, asked for a still larger British force, as a peace establishment; and Lord Grey says (p. 140), "It was with much difficulty we "spared the 2,500 men asked for." The American Colonies only on one occasion had any British troops to assist them against Indians, and that was at the commencement, not at the close of a war with them. They, moreover, paid for and supplied the troops which were sent them, and got rid of them as soon as they could.

Lord Grey gives his opinion (p. 141) that a standing force kept in a colony should, instead of being constantly under arms, and in receipt of pay, be established as settlers in the colony. Opposite extremes of colonial policy here meet. Lord Grey proposes that soldiers should be settled in colonies; the old Colonists settled themselves as soldiers. Lord Grey defends his proposition (p. 146), as combining the two objects of military defence and increased population, and he would have this country undertake such a combination of protection and emigration all over the world; even in tropical climates he would have the higher spots so occupied wherever an English soldier could breathe. In the present New Zealand war, however, we have heard nothing of his military pensioners settled there. In the early colonial native wars no other defenders were heard of but the settlers themselves.

A further contrast with former policy presents itself in Lord Grey's account of the civil expenditure of New Zealand. The Governor infers (p. 148-9), from the fact of there being a native population besides the Europeans in the Colony, "that it was, therefore, absolutely necessary that a con- "siderable annual expenditure, in excess of the colonial "revenue, should be sanctioned, by the British Parliament, "to provide for roads, public buildings, and other establish- "ments requisite for the assertion of British supremacy."—

(*Despatch* of Sir G. Grey, in Papers presented January, 1847, p. 15.) Lord Grey says that he and his colleagues fully concurred in these views, and that the Duke of Wellington was consulted, who, naturally as a soldier, advised the construction of roads. As they were to be lines of communication between English troops and English magistrates, they were of course to be constructed with English money. What, according to such notions, is left for colonists to do? Our first Colonies, while still under the conduct of the London Company, are described as having been without interest or occupation, from the want of women, property, and politics; but such *ennui* would be a blessing compared with the possession of everything to interest, and the freest organs of the public will about them, but the task of maintenance left in other hands.

It took but nine years, 1600—1609, for Virginia to emancipate herself from the London Company, and assert her English rights of self-control. Lord Grey, in 1846, was still debating whether New Zealand was ripe for an English Constitution, and when the concession was at length granted, Sir George Grey took upon himself to suspend its announcement, alleging fears of the susceptibilities which he had himself nurtured among the Natives. We still retain, though to the credit of Sir John Pakington the Constitution was given in 1852, the Native administration in our supposed care, annually exhibiting our ignorance of all concerning it in Parliament, and voting large sums from our taxes to pay for the disastrous consequences of that ignorance.

I have a recent letter from Mr. Fitzgerald, late Superintendent of Canterbury and Prime Minister at Auckland, in which he designates this present war as a complication of folly and wickedness. He calls our Native administration a simple confusion. The Native movements, which we should have fostered, we have repelled; and their crimes, which any government should have punished, we have wholly disregarded. We have effected nothing in their interest, and whenever our own in-

terests are the question, we have overridden all dispute by force. Above all change of policy, he insists first on the necessity of doing away the abomination of our management of Native affairs. He asks, "Can you believe for a moment that if the Assembly "had had uncontrolled power in Native affairs, and had to pay "the whole of the expenses, this wicked war would ever have "happened? If you do really direct the Native policy, why "don't you compel the Governor to write home for instructions "before taking the step which induces war? But you let "him do that which is actually a commencement of war at his "own discretion. He gets the British flag insulted, and then "you are compelled to avenge the insult. The whole Colony "is of course for war. It is a cheap way of being gallant "when others, overburdened as they are with taxes at home, "have to pay for it. I should be curious to see the faces of the "House of Representatives if a new Governor announced to "them that they might do as they liked about Native affairs, "but that no further funds would be forthcoming from home. "Indeed, to take higher grounds, I mourn over the youth of "this nation, which can by no means lead to greatness. War "—that ordeal of Providence for culling out the weeds among "nations—is close to our doors, but with it none of its disci-"pline or its benefits. Somebody else is fighting, not we. It is "our cause, but we fight by proxy, and pay by deputy. If we "ever become great we shall have been rocked and dandled "into power."

Sir Robert Peel described New Zealand as an island in form, latitude, and climate, so resembling England, as to bear promise, with our race and institutions, of a repetition of our happy destiny in another hemisphere. *Si qua* RETINACULA *rumpas, tu Marcellus eris.* Could you but cast off the fatal gift of England's patronage, you would be as herself. But England was not herself nursed and dandled into her present vigour. She has won it for herself, through many struggles, fighting her own way, not clinging to the support of others.

I find another striking contrast with our first colonial system in our present treatment of Canada.

Canada was won by conquest, and became the origin of our baser kind of Colonial government, but she has since had the same concessions of self-government, as other Colonies; and she now has complete popular representation, both in her metropolitan and municipal institutions. She may, therefore, fairly be compared with our earlier free Colonies. None of the Anglo-American Colonies exceeded her in freedom, or reached her present growth in wealth or population. Yet she is never without troops sent and paid by England. Mr. Elliott states (*Evid.* 121—132) that the whole pay of the regular forces always in Canada, including that of the Canadian Rifles, comes from the Imperial Treasury; and the entire cost of barracks and stores, and the whole expense of transport to and fro. It was once proposed to call upon the Province at least to keep in repair a selected number of barracks; but for various reasons the selection has never yet been made. When Sir Fenwick Williams commanded our forces in North America he discovered more military positions, where forts might be made. We immediately offered to make them, if the Colonists would only bear a portion of the expense. But they answered they were much obliged for the suggestion, but that they were not disposed to build new forts, and had not money to spare for troops.

Canada has, indeed, a militia, or at least a militia-roll; about a third in numbers, proportionately to population, of what a New England Colony would have had in constant training; but Mr. Elliott tells us (*Evid.* 109) that this militia-roll is so nominal an affair, that it would be a delusion to place dependence on any return based upon it. Late illustrations of the results of this colonial exemption from service, set off in strong contrast present with former times. When in old times Canada was the focus of French aggression, the adjoining

English Colonists armed themselves—repelled, retorted every threat. When civil war lately broke out in the United States, there was no threat to English Canada; but she was immediately supposed in danger, and helpless to meet the danger supposed. Three thousand English troops in addition, and perhaps in necessary sequence, to the promissory garrison already there, were instantly despatched to Canada, and placed in quarters at our expense. Some say our troops are as well there, as in home quarters; there is but the transport to consider. Is the cost of transport, however, all the difference between making every part of the Empire maintain troops, or making one part supply all? I doubt if it can be the same thing to us whether every part bear its share of service, and the aggregate strength be ready to collect at any point; or all British territory beyond the four seas be treated as outposts to be held by English garrisons against all comers, —a perplexity to us in war, a mere extravagance in peace. No such view as the latter alternative was taken by England when she bred great nations in her offspring colonies.

The *Army and Navy Gazette* threw out the conjecture that Lord Palmerston was not sending troops to Canada as a demonstration; nor with the view of scattering them in single files along the Canadian frontier; but because "he "was aware to what a height politics ran among that mixed "population; and, with a rabid war, with which much sym- "pathy was felt on one side or the other, close at hand, he "was anxious to strengthen the local authorities against "possible combinations." Sending detachments of English forces to maintain the influence of the Crown among a distant English community having three million inhabitants, as free and self-governed as those at home, is a scheme as chimerical as unconstitutional, and likely to be productive only of discord and jealousy, or of the corruption which alone can smother those passions under sordid calculations of pecuniary gain. The Queen might have said to her North American

subjects, had they been like her Grandfather's, Your neighbourhood is disturbed; you must therefore be prepared against any possible contingency. Call out your militia. If you want a more disciplined force on the emergency I will send as many troops as your Assembly may agree to pay for, and I can spare from England, to be put on your service. Should war occur I will furnish an auxiliary force. But no delay must take place in your own enlistments, and training for your own establishment; because home or other service may at any moment require the recall of my English troops. Such would have been the terms advised by Chatham.

Another contrast with our old colonial practice—and perhaps the most startling of all—is afforded by the entire occupation, in peace and war, of the South African Settlements by English troops, supplied and paid by drafts interminable, and often unaccounted for, on the Home Treasury. Cape Town, Graham's Town, and Natal Representatives sport with the policy which leads us through recurrent costly wars on their account. Dutch farmers spread their herds along a frontier rich in pasture, and only exposed to plunder which we ward off, or else restore; which to them, therefore, so far from being depreciatory of their property, is only a fresh source of profit. The market of an English commissariat is so brought to their doors. Army contractors purchase the very cattle which have been just recaptured, to feed the soldiers who serve as their gratuitous herdsmen.

The Select Committee were informed (*Evid.* 481), that £400,000 a year is so made over to the farmers of South Africa by the farmers and other tax-payers of this country. The liberal farmers of England are represented in Parliament as being enthusiastic for the continuance of this employment of our men and money in the farm service of the wealthy Cape proprietors. We are so pressing with our services, that the settlers have only one small police force to raise on their own account. We furnish and pay all the rest entirely; and we do

so not only on the ground of the inability of our Colonists to help themselves, but also because we suppose them to be as sanguinary as they are helpless: and if once let loose to defend their own farms, in their own way, it is supposed from past experience, they would outrage the feelings of humanity which belong to Englishmen at home. England now undertakes to nurse not only the strength, but the morality of her Colonies; and, in this case, the latter undertaking has ended in substituting, for the *lex talionis*, a chronic and bloody warfare between our regular army and the Kafirs trained by them to fight nearly as well as themselves: the perpetuity of which warfare is secured by the separation of the corrective agency from the source of strife, the conjunction of which made short work of the former practice of self-defence.

The whole evidence given before Mr. Mills' Committee is replete with instances of the novelty of our present colonial policy.

We scatter little garrisons in the West Indian Islands, which do police duty among the black population; or, being mostly black themselves, furnish police duty for the rest of the garrison. The Planters take no share in the task of defending their own property, and these little garrisons can never by any possibility be of the slightest use against a foreign enemy. So much of them as consists of English troops is sent from where they are in health and readiness for any emergency, only to be decimated in West Indian police service by yellow fever. This is an innovation as well as a vicious practice. The Island of Jamaica, even when it was Cromwell's recent conquest, was allowed an elected Council, by which to act for itself independently. The Planters asked for representation at home, if they could not have self-government fully on the spot—saying (see *Memorial from Jamaica*, 1651, State Paper Office), "if laws be imposed on us without our consent, we be no better than slaves." In 1670, their total white population was 15,198: and their

militia-roll then showed a strength of 2,720. Soon after the introduction of slaves, formidable insurrections occurred, but were always suppressed by the vigilance of the militia. That our West Indian Colonists are no less able to help themselves now is clear from the evidence of Sir C. Elliott before Mr. Mills's Committee; by which it appears that Antigua, and every island from which our troops have been withdrawn, have raised a militia for themselves; and that they look to the British fleet for external safety, and to the name of Englishman, which suggests reflection to every foreign invader.

What Minister would have dreamt in the last century of sending Royal Engineers under the pretence of making the surveys and roads of a new colony, as we have just done in the case of British Columbia? Under some excuse or other a little garrison is now deposited, as a Palladium, in all English Colonies. Their native energies are taken under the guardianship of the higher power, whose ensign is hoisted, not by themselves as their own, but by the tutelary sovereignty, in chivalrous assumption of their protection, and in menace against the whole world. Our better Statesmen knew that the true defence of a small English Colony lay rather in the knowledge of other nations that in attacking it they attacked a part of England, and came in conflict not with a mere garrison, but with a portion of the British nation, alike circumstanced, and in common cause with the rest.

I take my leave of this part of my subject, by giving the following statistical index of the total inversion which has taken place in our colonial military relations. In the last century Wolfe conquered Canada with an army chiefly consisting of colonial militia. England now, in time of peace, keeps twice as many troops in all her Colonies, exclusive of military posts, as the colonists enrol among themselves.

I proceed to the consideration of the still greater anomaly and novelty, of our contributions to the civil and ecclesiastical

expenses of our colonial fellow-subjects, of which I have only incidentally given one instance as yet.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century the annual imports into all the New England provinces from England were estimated, by Neal, at £100,000. The exports by the English merchants consisted of dried cod-fish sold in Europe for £80,000, and of 3,000 tons of naval stores.

In the Colonial *Blue Book* just presented, I find the imports of Canada stated at 24,766,981 dols.; the exports at 33,555,161 dols.; the duty collected 4,437,846 dols.; land sales produced 459,803 dols., of which one-half came from sales of clergy-lands: and the population amounts to about three millions; while, in Mr. Lowe's words (*Evid.* 3,335), "by "the guarantee of this country in time of war, they are enabled "to apply their revenues entirely to their own local purposes."

With this comparative statement before me of the small beginnings on which New England maintained herself, in ordinary circumstances, independently; and the wealth of which Canada now asks us to guarantee her safe possession, under the pledge of a constant garrison; I proceed to look into No. 5 of our last *Civil Service Estimates;* and I find that, not content with relieving the strength of such a Colony of the task of defending its wealth, we further contribute to its wealth, by paying Canadian Bishops, Rectors, and Archdeacons, although the Crown has given up the sales of clergy-lands, which were expressly reserved for that purpose. We give a small salary to the President of a College; and pensions, and blankets for aged Indians, and other charitable donations.

Writing of New England, Grahame says (Book II. chap. i.) "To a community of men thus assembled the formation of "their Church appeared the most interesting of all their con- "cerns, and it occupied, accordingly, their earliest and earnest "deliberations." I have related how, in the midst of their first struggles for existence, they founded their own Colleges:

and as to missionary labours among the Indians, so far from having English taxes voted to them for the purpose, their early history is filled with such names as Elliott, and Mayhew, and hundreds of American Missionaries whose work was amply supported by liberal colonial subscriptions and endowments; and, kindling missionary sympathies at home, gave birth to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which is now apart from its purpose, in partnership with our Treasury, subsidizing the colonial church. Australia is just beginning to legislate for the endowment of its own Churches.

The fourth item in our last colonial estimates is £17,800 for British Columbia, the detail of which would be wholly unintelligible to countrymen of our old colonies. What would the members of Congress say to a demand from a newly formed State for £1,800 a year from the central Treasury for its governor's salary—£1,200 more for surveying its lands—£11,000 more for the pay of a standing federal force to act as its police, and that of the costliest kind, as any equivalent to the Royal Engineers sent out to Columbia would be—£1,800 more for an Assay Office—and, as a last freak of impudence, £2,000 more for unexplained contingencies? What would the English Parliament in the seventeenth century have said to any one of these demands from a new colony?

We vote, in the fifth item of our estimates, £25,000 for governors, and £15,000 more for magistrates of the West Indian Islands, whose police expenses occupied a previous estimate. The vagaries of English legislation with regard to those islands have certainly violated all ordinary rules of policy: entitling their inhabitants to make, and exposing us to meet, any sort of anomalous claim. The bygone spirit of territorial acquisitiveness, and the magnanimity of universal philanthropy have left us an inheritance of liabilities in that part of the world which we might be glad to compound for by the sacrifice of every possible imperial interest we have there, even including the right to cut

logwood in Honduras, and the special privilege of protectorship over the mosquitoes.

Our colonial connexion with all that part of the world, including the Isthmus, produces literally no other result to this country but frequent embroilment with foreign American powers, and a frightful mortality among all the men we send there.

Should that mortality, however, seem insignificant to any one, let him look at the next item in our estimates, and he will find £15,000 a year more devoted to no other object than the maintenance of those pest holes in the name of Colonies on the deadly western coast of Africa, of which, when in 1785 it was proposed to send convicts there, Burke said "that the conse-"quences of transportation were not meant to be deprivation of "life: and of Gambia it might truly be said, that there all life "dies, and all death lives." Whether these, and the valuable possession of St. Helena, which stands next on our list, are kept at all as Colonies, or in what light they present their strange contrast with our former foreign possessions, it is difficult to say. We occupied Sierra Leone for the purpose of importing free blacks, and Gambia for exporting slave blacks under the Assiento Treaty, and we continue to sacrifice Englishmen there in hopes of discouraging Slave Trade. In the possession of St. Helena we have no apparent object.

The ninth item of these estimates exhibits another novelty —the cost of abandoning territory; in spite of which the last accounts from South Africa intimate an intention of fresh annexation, in the modern manner of colonization, in the same quarter.

The last item I will notice in the Colonial Estimates for this year, and not the least remarkable, is the 10th, which devotes £27,000, a reduced vote from £40,000 in previous years, for "improving Kafirs." The imagination of a similar charge upon the English Treasury, for enabling the Governors

of the New England Colonies to make their own experiments in the great work of civilizing the neighbouring Indians—which those Colonies themselves undertook—would be an obvious inconsistency with the spirit and history of those times.

But in no instance do the features of our existing colonial system contrast more violently with those of our first system, than in what are called Convict Colonies. How we arrived at such an idea at all is a question belonging to my next topic for consideration—the process of deterioration. The indignation with which certain attempts to send convicts to America were met by our old Colonists is well known; and their proposal to return cargoes of snakes. But the idea of a Convict Settlement would scarcely come within the comprehension of the descendants of Raleigh's adventurers, or receive a moment's toleration from the inheritors of the spirit of the Pilgrim Fathers.

We have lately seen advertisements of the prosperity of Western Australia; and it is said that that settlement has been benefited by the receipt of convicts. Much in the same way a gaol is benefited by the receipt of prisoners; as it would otherwise be empty and useless—a mere abode of paid officers without any service to be paid for. Western Australia lives merely on Government service. Its very neighbourhood is hated, and all communication tabooed, by every decent colony; its name is a reproach; and its whole idea not so much in contrast with, as absolutely antagonistic and injurious to, all colonization.

A convict colony is the strongest instance possible of the entire subversion of this country's fundamental principles in colonizing. The colonial relation of equal rights must have become obliterated, before the mother country would seek from a colony the service of scavengers. "Moab is my wash-pot," was the expression of Hebrew poetry for the utmost degradation in subserviency of one community to another.

The gauge of this baser theory seems to comprehend all that has startled us within its compass. The long denial of con-

stitutional government—the retention of protection even after that has been conceded—the language of some of our statesmen who gave evidence before the Committee, often complimentary to the "liberality" of any colony which has begun to pay anything towards our expenses in maintaining it—the pitiful attitude recently assumed by the Cape and New Zealand—all is intelligible on the wide principle of colonial subserviency and dependence, which embraces a convict colony.

But that there may be no doubt about the colonial theory which this country now adopts, Lord Grey, the best authority, and, as a Statesman, high-minded, and habitually taking the largest views, even in explaining his own recommendation that we should "return to our former and sounder colonial system," lays down this as his basis:—"I think that the very notion "of a colonial relation between this country and our pos- "sessions implies *protection on the one side, and obedience on the* "*other, within certain limits.*"—(*Evid.* 2,531.)

Lord John Russell, as Prime Minister, in 1850, made a great oration in the House of Commons, on colonial policy, on introducing a bill for the government of the Australian Colonies. (Corrected Copy, Ridgway, p. 17.) He explained his benevolent object to be "to promote their capacity for self- "government;" and his argument was, "that it is our bounden "duty to maintain the Colonies which have been placed under "our charge; we cannot get rid of the obligation to govern "them for their benefit." Of this view of the subject, Mr. Gladstone said (*New Zealand Government Debate*, 1852):— "An administrative establishment, effected by legislative "enactments, or by the executive power of the Crown, and "by the funds of the people of England, is the root and trunk "around which we now expect a colonial population to grow, "under which, by degrees, that population is, according to our "modern and most unhappy phrase, *to be trained for freedom.*"

A leading weekly paper thus confidently anticipates the judgment of its readers on the present claims of New

Zealand to protection, by this general proposition—"that "the common sense view of colonial policy is at all events "not to abandon a community of Englishmen to their own "guidance, until there is a fair probability that they will "be safe from external interference during the difficulties "which belong to the early stages of constitutional govern-"ment." (*Saturday Review*, September 21st.)

Thus widely far have we wandered from the constitutional recognition of the common rights, powers, and liabilities of English citizens at home or abroad, till we have arrived at a theory of "protecting obedient" colonies, "promoting their capacity for self-government," nevertheless continuing to "maintain and govern them as committed to our charge;" and even after self-government is given them, taking care not to "abandon them to their own guidance," nor suffer them to cope with their own difficulties.

5.—The Causes and Process of the Change which has taken place in our Colonial Relations.

Lord Grey says, in his work on *Colonial Policy*, and repeats, in his recent *Evidence* (2,529), that he believes "it "was not till the time of the great revolutionary war with "France, that nearly the whole burthen of the defence of "the Colonies was undertaken by this country." That war and this folly, no doubt, occurred about the same time; but they had little to do with each other.

After the separation of the American Colonies, our present chief Colonies came into a relation with us which had a very different original character from that of the colonization of New England.

Canada was conquered shortly before the loss of the thirteen provinces. The attempt of the English Parliament to recover from those provinces its share of the cost of that joint conquest, and to establish the right of taxing those Colonists

where they were not represented, precipitated their resolution to hold even to England less tenaciously than to English rights.

England, perhaps fortunately for the rest of the world, was unable to appreciate their value in common citizenship with herself; and she got in exchange for her American territory an old French military occupation, inhabited by French Roman Catholics, with manners and habits, socially and politically, the reverse of her own.

This was the turning point of our colonial relations. Into Canada we at first introduced the civil law of England. All offices were conferred on the British military and traders; but they treated with such contempt the French *noblesse*, that it became necessary, for peace and quiet, to restore the *Coutume de Paris*, and a Legislative Council was constituted by the Quebec Bill, 1774, reserving taxation in the hands of the Government, *à la Française*. We soon had to fight with our vigorous old Colonists for the possession of our new Colony, and should inevitably have lost it to them, had not those recent changes brought the only true defence of any country on our side—the goodwill and co-operation of its inhabitants. On the termination of the American war, Mr. Pitt obtained for Canada the external form of representative assemblies, but withheld their life—the control over taxation.

The fretting of the English part of the Colony under a Constitution English in form, French in spirit, and the general incompatibility of the two races brought together in Canada, encouraged, in 1812, another American invasion, which, however, the Canadian volunteers themselves, in the first instance, repelled.

Even under so imperfect a Constitution it had not yet occurred to English Colonists to look to England to defend them "in their first difficulties." Four battalions of militia, the Canadian Voltigeurs, a fine corps especially suited to the country, were organized, equipped, and officered by the young Canadian gentry. The troops of England were fully occupied elsewhere.

From the peace of 1815 there were constant struggles between our Government and the Canadians for the command of their purse, complicated by the differences of race and religion; which partial concessions, and Lord Durham's mission, only served to mitigate. Rebellion, and rebellion losses charged on England, were the process by which, at length, responsible government, and its own control over its own revenue, were won by Canada. Halting at this stage of constitutional revival, our colonial government then entered its present anomalous phase, in which a colony is possessed of free representative institutions, and England retains to herself its garrison duties, as a trophy of her supremacy.

It is significant of the confusion which was already introduced into our Statesmen's minds, at that time, on colonial relations, that in a celebrated despatch to Lord Sydenham, Governor-General of Canada, 14th October, 1839, Lord John Russell thus argued that "responsible government" was impossible in a colony. "If we seek to apply such a principle "to a colony, we shall find ourselves at fault. The power "for which a Minister is responsible in England, is not his "own power, but the power of the Crown, of which he is the "organ. It is obvious that the executive Councillor of a "colony is in a situation totally different. The Governor, "under whom he serves, receives his orders from the Crown "of England. But the colonial Council cannot be the "advisers of the Crown of England. It may happen, "therefore, that the Governor receives, at the same time, "instructions from the Queen, and advice from his Council "totally at variance. . . . . It would have been "impossible for any Minister to support in the Parliament "of the United Kingdom the measures which a ministry, "headed by M. Papineau, would have imposed on the Go-"vernor of Lower Canada." As if the Crown having a deputy in a colony gave it two-fold action, or made any difference in the constitution. The sole point in dispute was

the responsibility of the local ministry to the colonial people. Lord John's difficulty was based on the supposition that colonial legislation must in all things be made subservient to the will of the English Parliament; which was running on the old rock again on which American connexion split. Englishmen will be represented in their own assembly. We had to yield the point again in Canada; and although a very imperfect form of responsible government was then given, yet this early history of Canada proves the impossibility of keeping down a colony, in which even any infusion of British spirit enters, as a bureaucratic dependency.

Lord Durham had well replied, before, to the assertion that self-government would lead to separation, that, "on the contrary, cessation of undue interference on our part would "strengthen the bond of sympathy and interest; the connexion would become more durable because more healthy, "by having more of equality, of freedom, and of local independence. Even if increased power gave increased national "feeling, it was our first duty to secure the well being of our "colonial countrymen, and to take good care that if ever they "were to separate from us, they should not be found unfit to "govern themselves." Canada had responsible government conceded in the amplest form, and has proved the truth of Lord Durham's prediction, and the error in Lord John Russell's theory. She still wants the corollary of self-government—self-defence.

In the absence of the old spirit of colonization, there was no restraint upon the natural tendency of a great maritime nation to treat the rest of the world simply as made for its own use. The first instance of such a tendency soon followed the loss of our old Colonies. America had at last submitted to receive our convicts in the way of buying them as slaves at £20 a head: though New England remonstrated to the last against the practice. This mode of disposing of our criminals being, in 1786, shut against us, it was proposed to empty the crowded hulks in the Thames upon the west

coast of Africa. The proposal was negatived in Parliament on account of the unhealthiness of the African climate. The discovery of New Holland by Captain Cook, offered a better site for the novel experiment of a penal settlement: and an English community sprung up in the Southern hemisphere, of which the governor was head gaoler, the council consisted of turnkeys, the revenue of English salaries, and the defences of the English Governor's guard.

In this I recognize the mould of the new colonial formation; and all the freedom which our present great Australian Colonies have since acquired, chiefly by the national impetus given them by their discovery of gold, has not yet obliterated its traces, nor has even the self-government of Canada fully regained the ancient type.

The South African is the only other great group of Colonies which has been since attached to this empire.

The mode of its acquisition, alike with that of Canada uncongenial with free colonization, is also strikingly illustrative of the weakness of mere dependencies as distinguished from what we used to call colonies. Probably Holland had wasted millions in maintaining for a century and a half the garrison at Cape Town, which in 1795 could only strike its flag to the British fleet; and though restored at the Peace of Amiens, became prisoners a second time with equal facility on the renewal of war. The government of this Colony, which had under the Dutch been administered by District Councils, and magistrates, was on its final occupation by Great Britain in 1806, committed to a military Governor sent from England. In 1835, an Executive Council was formed, consisting of the principal Government Officers, and the Commander of the Forces; and a Legislative Council nominated by the Crown. In 1850, wholesale constituent powers were given to the Colonists to form the perfectly free government which it now enjoys, without however losing the character of a dependency, having all its defences still undertaken by the mother country.

Even the Ionian Islands' Protectorate was looked upon as a colonial acquisition; and ranked with our Colonies.

Coincidently with these transitions in our colonial relations, significant changes have concurred in the name and nature of the colonial office at home.

The Board of Trade and Plantations was the first designation of a colonial office in London; and it is a monument of the commercial views then taken of colonies, and of the struggle which took place on the part of England to maintain Navigation Acts, and on the part of the Colonies to evade them.

The appointment of a Colonial Secretary of State, 1768, marks the period of home interference which we have noted as the origin of change in the principle of our colonial relations. Now began the government of Colonies in Downing-street. The Secretaryship ceased on the loss of the American Colonies—"Othello's occupation" was "gone."

In 1794, the business of the Colonies was carried on at the Home Office, New South Wales having then given a police character to our colonial administration.

In 1801, it was transferred to the War Department, a change suggested by our military occupation of conquests during the war.

In 1816, Mr. Tierney moved for the restoration of the old colonial office; but the Colonies had not, by that time, recovered even the first step back towards former relations; Lord Castlereagh replied, that "the policy of this country "was founded on the conviction that it would not be wise to "permit the erection of a local authority, in the shape of a "Parliament in the Colonies of which Great Britain had ob-"tained possession. Consequently the superintending control "of the Colonial Secretary of State had been augmented."

Now that every colony, properly so called, has that "local authority," one hardly knows what there is for the re-established colonial office to do, beyond the management of

a few Crown Colonies. Its chief work of late has been to present annually to Parliament a *Blue Book* of colonial statistics—the population, number of sheep, newly erected telegraphs, &c., of each colony—and to watch the operation of the Passengers Act, for which it has also a separate office. The War Office practically transacts all the remaining colonial government business of this country.

In such manner, we have arrived at colonial relations midway between those of former times, and the reverse into which they had fallen; *i. e.* between the freest self-government and dependence. Our colonial result is a protected autonomy.

6.—Reasons considered for making a complete Return to former Colonial Relations, and Arguments against doing so refuted.

Lord Grey, in the introduction to his *Colonial Policy*, p. 10, well says, that "the abandonment of the old commercial system of this country towards the Colonies has not "diminished the inetrest of the Colonies in their connexion "with England, nor of England in the retention of the "Colonies. The possession of a number of steady allies in "various quarters of the globe adds strength to a nation, both "physically and morally, and the advantage to the Colonies is "far greater."

In this sentiment I fully agree with Lord Grey; but when he further proceeds to explain what he means by this desirable connexion, I find that, in his view (p. 17), the "steady allies" are "to be assisted to govern themselves."

He fears that some have had representative institutions allowed to them prematurely; but he would, nevertheless, make them undertake their own defence. This, he says, would be but to return to what was formerly the practice of this country, which he calls (p. 44) a sounder system.

I cannot see why Canada and Australia should not be now

as ripe as Virginia and Massachusetts were a few years after their settlement for representative institutions. At all events they have them. To me, therefore, the conclusion comes, *a fortiori*, that colonial self-defence is the sounder system.

It is the natural state of things that they who freely govern themselves should maintain their own government. It is specially the natural spirit of Englishmen to rely on themselves, and not to lean on others. It is the nature of our race to propagate itself by seedlings, not by suckers. It is even in the nature of things an impracticable system of government to let distant communities devise their own policy, follow their own interests, make their own neighbour wars, and from the centre of empire to undertake to maintain for them their various policy, protect their interests, and fight their wars. We have not even the acquaintance with their affairs to keep our Executive concurrent with them. How laughable, the other day, was the exhibition of ignorance upon the strength of which Parliament resolved to furnish men and money for the New Zealand Native war, the local authors of which were almost immediately afterwards discredited!

Besides, the utmost amount of protection which in the way of garrisons we could possibly afford to all the Colonies, must be wholly ineffectual for their security. If England ever lost the command of the seas in a war, no one would expect those garrisons to supply the means of local defence with which a spirited and devoted people accustomed to the use of arms could supply themselves. Those very garrisons have displaced and superseded the first and best defence. In Mr. Lowe's words (*Evid.* 3,405), "every English soldier in a colony prevents a hundred colonists from taking up arms and drilling."

If we would make our colonial protection in any degree replace the strength it has displaced, we must first, according to Sir J. Burgoyne's *Evidence* (App. No. 7), spend £1,000,000 in completing colonial fortifications. To garrison those fortifica-

tions would occupy an increasingly large proportion of our army in the most precarious kind of service. For our home-defence we must then have much more recourse to mercenaries, and if we are to be ready to take our proper part in such wars as we have been recently involved in, foreign legions with all their hazardous enlistment, and German regiments with their expensive terms of disbanding, must be our substitute for the English troops, which we have scattered over the world. It seems enough to condemn the present system that during the late war we should have sent our troops to Kafraria, hired a German Legion in their place for home-service, and finally disbanded the Legionaries by settling them as colonists in Kafraria; or that, as the Duke of Newcastle tells us he believes (*Evid.* 2,952), five supplementary regiments were sent by us to Canada in 1856, in anticipation of differences with the United States about our recruiting among them,—that is, that having first scattered our own troops abou' 'he Colonies, we made a fresh enemy in an attempt to hire foreigners to fill their place, and then had to increase the colonial detachments to confront that enemy. The conclusion to which the Select Committee came was, "that the "tendency of modern warfare being to strike blows at the "heart of a hostile power, it is therefore desirable to con- "centrate the troops required for the defence of the United "Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval "supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant "dependencies of the Empire." (*Report*, s. 19.)

In fact, every part of the Empire should raise its own means of defence at home, and at the sound of danger all should be ready to rally round the threatened point, the ocean being our proper medium of national intercommunication, and every enemy being made aware that on his temporary success in any quarter, the vengeance of the whole Empire waits.

I recollect the late Prussian Minister, De Bunsen, who was well acquainted with our affairs, remarking that it was

fortunate for other nations that England suppressed as she did the development of her strength throughout the world. It may be fortunate for others, but I am not content myself to see England presenting herself among other nations, when any emergency arises, as the weakest instead of the strongest of the world's powers—contributing subsidies of money instead of men to her allies—as a tributary rather than co-ordinate in war. I cannot rejoice like a Prussian, in seeing England employ a portion of her forces in preventing the service of four-fold more, while she reduces herself to be an applicant for mercenaries from other countries to enable her to fulfil her obligations.

If, like Athens under Themistocles, we received quotas of men or money from a confederacy, to furnish in return a common defence—or if, like Spain, England reserved a feudal tribute from all the products of dependent colonies in lieu of personal service—or if, like the Dutch, our Government embarked itself in the colonial commerce, and made a revenue from it which it would be their business to protect — in any such case we might fairly be expected to bear the burthen of our own undertaking. But why should all the autonomous communities which now make up the British Empire — from vigorous Canada to the golden Englands of the south—quarter themselves on the deeply-mortgaged patrimony of the mother-country, to which they bring no other profit than any foreigner brings, with whom she may have commercial dealings? Can youth or poverty be their plea? or is it the pride of old England on which they impose, which makes her reckless of an extra million of annual expense, to treat her family as she thinks becomes her dignity? Mr. Lowe told the Committee (*Evid.* 3,411) that the Victorians are wise enough to see that even paying English soldiers is their cheapest mode of providing themselves with a police. But it is not so easy for the English tax-payer to see why he should reduce the police expenses of Victoria.

We have recently heard that the Attorney-General at Melbourne made his fortune on his first arrival, as counsel for the Ballarat rioters, being then an English Barrister of one year's standing. Cannot a Government afford to pay for a police in a country where the rioters can pay 1,000-guinea-fees for their Counsel?

But against all these reasons for colonies contributing their own strength to the common stock, it is urged that we should lose all remaining connexion with the colonies if we withdrew our constant protection from them. Mr. Roebuck asks (*Evid.* 3,787), would not a colony, allowed to do what it likes, and to protect itself, be independent? The answer is, that the connexion with a colony on the same terms of citizenship with ourselves must be stronger, because healthier and more natural, than on terms of dependence. National affinities, and commercial interests, and partnership in a great name, are strong ties with us, which would not be weakened, but strengthened, by a Colony taking its full share with the rest of the Empire in the distribution of responsibilities, the habit of fulfilling which especially constitutes the national character.

I agree with Mr. Lowe (*Evid.* 3,407), that the constant presence of imperial troops in colonies tends to shorten, instead of prolonging, their connexion with the parent state. In time of peace there should be no imperial troops in any colony (3,370). If it has the least disposition to separate, a few troops will not restrain it, but, on the contrary, may very likely commit it in hostilities. The handful of troops which England sends is not the inducement to a colony to adhere to her, but her vast power which is unseen behind them (3,402).

Mr. Fortescue, however, representing the Colonial Office on Mr. Mills's Committee, suggests (*Evid.* 1,368—72) that we should take warning from the example of our first American Colonies, now become foreign powers, and possible enemies.

But, if he must allow that giving every part of the Empire free exercise of self-action, *i. e.*, the habit of acting for itself, and looking to itself for the safety of its own affairs, is the only way to secure health, and vigour, and civic virtue throughout its length and breadth; surely even if the ultimate separation of distant governments from the central sovereignty were a possible result from this process of development of vigour, he would not thence infer an argument for checking that development, and crippling that vigour. He would hardly propose clipping the young eagles' wings because former broods had found escape from torment by flight. I have already given proof enough, that it was not their independent conduct of their own affairs which led to the separation of the American Colonies. When they raised their own forces like the rest of the Empire, and fought like other Englishmen, and other Englishmen fought with them at need, their attachment to England grew so strong that the best judges denied to the last the possibility of our change of treatment ending, as it did, in separation. If Canada now raised an adequate militia for her own requirements, and garrisoned her own forts, and ceased to look for men or pay from England, until the occasion of war might call the forces of the Empire together, would she feel less inclined to remain in her allegiance by an increased sense of equal treatment and common action with her fellow-subjects at home? Should we feel afraid of her consequently becoming a foreign power, and possibly an enemy? Is this why we are afraid to trust her with arms, and continue to treat her as a dependency?

Lord Russell, in a recent speech at Newcastle, took pride to himself, in reflection on his past career, that he had not been as other Ministers in less happy countries who "consider "it a part of the duty of government to fetter and bind the "talents and abilities of men." Is he sure that this has not been his "colonial policy" all his life? Is he content

with such abstinence from meddling only at home, and does distance lend enchantment to what seems to him so offensive in a nearer view?

But there are others who, granting that every part of the Empire ought to act alike, and, controlling its own affairs, should vote and furnish its own equipment, urge on us the unfairness of throwing particular charges which properly belong to the whole Empire on any one locality. Let it pass that that is the very unfairness of which I am complaining on the part of England; let us see how it may be urged on the part of a colony.

The Duke of Newcastle says (*Evid.* 2,961), that Nova Scotia, for instance, should no more be taxed in men or money for the garrison of Halifax than the county of Hampshire for the garrison of Portsmouth. But that is exactly the parallel I wish to establish. Let the two cases be treated alike in demand of men and money, and my principle is conceded. True it is that New England, with a smaller population, wholly defended Boston, a place of great imperial importance —but I will not ask the utmost application of such precedents. The taxes and men voted for our military estimates are furnished by Hampshire in common with the rest of the kingdom, but no part of the men or money which maintain the garrison of Halifax are voted and furnished by the Nova-Scotian legislature; and even though Halifax be an imperial fortress, yet Nova Scotia is part of the Empire. The smallness of its interest is the worst of all arguments for its being overlooked. (Duke of Newcastle, *Evid.* 3,021.) So also it is replied against arguments for community of responsibilities, that a West Indian Island, though self-governed, could not wholly protect itself. The answer is, that though no small territory can find sufficient men or money to defend itself in all cases; yet its being detached and self-governed does not properly relieve it, in its degree, of the duties of citizenship which it would have to bear as an integral part of England; but its self-government demands that its share of men and

money should be raised on the spot: and that would be always sufficient for internal order; and its general protection would be the same—whether so detached or not—namely, the common power of the Empire. In fact, its self-government makes it the only judge as well as controller of its own requirements for peace and security, and throws upon it the sole responsibility for its own disturbance.

It is a good illustration of the arbitrariness of the colonial protective principle that Ceylon, treated apart from India, has her defence undertaken by England; treated as part of India, she would have her full share of military and other burthens to bear in common with all India; not, as Sir George Grey intimates (Question 2,564, *Evid.*), separately by herself, but as subjects of a Government which, coterminously with its revenue, raises over its whole area the means required for its defence.

But then, it is said, even if England should not undertake to protect her Colonies, still she must place a few of her own troops in each as a nucleus around which they may rally, and which would assist them in their military organization (Lord Herbert's *Evid.* 3,611). Others say, we must send a few troops as "a guard to the governors" (*Evid.* 329), or as "emblems of the connexion with the mother country" (*Evid.* 335), which Lord Herbert called the sentimental view of the subject (*Evid.* 3,630).

All these are new colonial notions bred from the habits of the new *régime*.

I will consider first the necessity of a permanent nucleus of English troops, round which the ordinary colonial forces, whatever they may be, may organize themselves. There is no Colony which it is so important for us to keep in sound relations with ourselves as Canada. I will, therefore, consider this point in connexion with that, as the strongest case for my opponents.

The number of troops which the highest authorities, in-

cluding Lord Grey, Lord Elgin, and the Duke of Newcastle, agree in thinking to be necessary as such a nucleus in Canada, is one regiment of the line, which, with the Canadian Rifles, should hold Quebec and Kingston (*Evid.* 2,948). The question, then, is, whether these regiments should be raised, and paid, and sent by England, or consist of Canadians, or, at least, be put on the votes of the Canadian Parliament. It is certain that our old Colonies would have insisted on this last condition as essential to their rights. I have already (p. 10) related the answer of Virginia to James I. even in an hour of peril, refusing to receive English troops on any other terms. Let Canada, however, by all means, look to England in the hour of peril, and England look to her in her hour of peril also; but if the sight of English red-coats, at all times, has become a needful support of Canadian confidence, and English pay has ceased to be resented as a symptom of dependence, we must bow humbly under the conviction that Canada is no longer inhabited by men like those who conquered her. Even in 1812 she needed no nucleus round which to organize a powerful militia; though then the ancient colonial spirit was so far changed that she permitted England to furnish her militia with arms and pay. But the incidence of cost is only important as indicating the seat of responsibility (Mr. Gladstone's *Evid.* 3,795).

Mr. Merivale, who for many years was a very able Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, told the Committee (*Evid.* 2,439), that the English troops in New Brunswick are meant for little else than as a guard of honour to the Governor. But he allows that being so sent they are taken as a sort of pledge that England undertakes their entire defence, and that they are thereby deterred from taking any steps or care for their own security. No wonder a Prize-Essay, which I have lately seen, emanating from the literary Institutions of that Colony, describes New Brunswick as "a noble example of the greatness which "may be achieved by an industrious people protected by a

"powerful and liberal parent state." A Provincial Governor's "guard of honour" would be more creditably and safely furnished by those about him: and as for an "emblem of the "Queen of England's sovereignty," a handful of troops from England serves much rather to mark a *limitation* of a sovereignty, which can only levy men at home for whatever part of an extensive Empire they may be needed, even for the mere purpose of parade. The prestige of empire would be better illustrated by all possible varieties of race and costume parading all over the world under England's flag, and mustering everywhere to the sound of our national anthem. The poor idea of a reiterated display of home troops wherever our flag appears, reminds me rather of a scene in the *Unequal Match*, in which two or three soldiers are seen perpetually rushing from post to post to increase the apparent strength of the little army of some wretched German Grand-Duke.

There are other men who, laughing at the fancy policy of emblematic and parade detachments of the army, think a few English soldiers very necessary in every Colony to keep it from commercial antagonism to the mother country. "We should "soon have Morrill tariffs in Canada, if we withdrew our "garrisons," I heard one say—a singular example of that supercilious ignorance of everything beyond our immediate vision in which this imperial nation much resembles ancient Rome; and which of itself is condemnatory of our pretensions to govern distant colonies. That independent colonial action which, it is supposed, might result from the withdrawal of English troops is now in full exercise, in the presence of our troops, indeed under the sole protection of our troops. Mr. Gladstone replies to Mr. Ellice's question (*Evid.* 3,785) "whether the old Colonies were not more independent than the present," that "on the contrary, it would undoubtedly not "have been permitted to those Colonies to exercise any power "to legislate adversely to the mother country, whereas we "have recent experience in Canada that even that power

" may be exercised by our present Colonies with a view of " raising up a protected interest against the commerce of the " mother country." The truth is, in Mr. Godley's words, (see *Report*, Appendix 321)—" political conditions have little to do " with such matters; they are mainly governed by economical " considerations, *i.e.*, by the varying productions and wants of " the people." Our present colonial relations are no prevention against commercial antagonism.

Some are ready to recognize an equitable claim on the part of colonies, to protection from the metropolis, in whose councils they are not represented, or have no actual voice; inasmuch as they are, or may be, involved in wars over which their Assemblies have not as much control as the Home Parliament.

If this be a fair principle, our historical application of it has been certainly capricious. Mr. Gladstone observes (*Evid.* 3,784), " that the primary responsibility for self-defence, (which " is all that is contended for,) was borne by our old Colonies under " circumstances when they were almost certain to be drawn " into entirely English quarrels, and to be made, directly, the " subject of contest among European powers—a state of things " to which, with our present ideas, we can hardly have a " parallel."

Does England now draw her Colonies, or her Colonies draw her, into most war? If England were a foreign power to them, instead of being their shield against the interference of all foreign powers, they would soon learn how they might be more involved in war. They have, on the other hand, themselves the chief influence in Imperial implication in war. It is their being spread over all the world which brings us in contact, at so many points, with the sensibilities, jealousies, and cupidities of other nations, and which makes a war so wide a concern to us. Though the Irish temperament enters into but one-third of our national composition, we cannot help our skirts of empire being spread about the earth, on which any one may

tread his challenge. What brought us to the verge of hostilities on the Maine boundary, or, more lately, on the Musquito shore, or at St. Juan's, or about the Newfoundland fisheries; or why are we now sending troops to Canada? As the *Times* says, in reflection on present events, "If Canada had "not been a British possession, there would have been no "reviling of England, no warlike demonstrations against Eng- "land, and no outrages committed on the English flag." I say nothing of millions of our taxes consumed in Kafir and Maori campaigns. Little interest or control has the British Parliament had in the incurring of any of these costly liabilities on behalf of Colonies.

Far be it from me to deny that the practical exclusion of colonial legislatures from immediate control on the supreme Executive demands some fair consideration; but is there not a compensation in the partnership with a nation which few dare threaten, and which will never fail to rally round its own when danger comes?

The fear that colonists may expect to have the command of troops which they raise or pay for, is more specious than real. If they pay for the troops they command, they may safely be allowed to command the troops they pay. Their forces will chiefly consist of militia. Even the United States, at the breaking out of the present war, had about 3,000,000 militia to 12,000 regulars. That colonies should assume a different foreign policy from that of the mother country, would be less likely in proportion as they took a real part themselves in maintaining the same policy. If the supposition be not altogether chimerical, at all events the mere withdrawal of an English regiment will not give it probability.

Lastly, there may perhaps exist a lurking misgiving in the Ministerial class of minds lest the Crown should lose some patronage, when every Colony assumes its individual action as a component part of the Empire; and that it is as well for the Crown to hold fast remaining shreds of patronage, in demo-

cratic days, rather than speculate on the increase of imperial power which a developed policy might give.

But the concession of self-government, which is already past retracting, was the real hazard of colonial patronage; and if Victoria, for example, still continues ungrudging—nay, lavish—of her salaries to the Crown's representatives, she is not likely to dispute that, or any other appointment, merely because, as a corollary of her free Constitution, her military expenditure, as well as her civil list, should be voted among the Estimates of her own Legislature.

On the whole consideration of the question between completing the return to our original colonial relations, or halting half-way, where we are now—retaining the duties, having conceded the rights, of colonial government—I think every man's deliberate judgment must incline towards the completion of the policy, on the course of which we have, by the force of national tendencies, been led to go so far already.

7.—The Manner in which a complete Return to our original Colonial Relations might be safely and satisfactorily effected.

Though the step to be taken is but the complement of a reform half effected already, yet no change whatever in relations so important, as those between our Colonies and ourselves, should be made abruptly.

It is not from any want of appreciation of the value of colonial connexion that I advocate the completion of colonial self-government, but because I consider no interest this country has is more important. Besides the pride and natural sympathy which makes us hold in high respect our relationship with countries peopled with our kindred, of the same qualities and habits which we value in ourselves, and brought into a community of policy by the same allegiance; there are material advantages also on both sides, which prompt a due

regard and consideration for the maintenance of mutual friendship. It is because I conceive that while the Colonies depend on England for the means of their ordinary administration, they can never, even though they have free Constitutions, be on equal terms of fellow-citizenship with ourselves, that I wish our relations with them to be made sound, in order that they may be cordial and lasting. Even if Canada, or Australia, may become ultimately so great and flourishing, by means of self-reliance, that their partnership in government with us may be no longer possible, I would prepare for a transition from fellowship to alliance no less friendly, by removing every cause of jealousy or incapacity by which the process of transition might take the form of rupture, or the subsequent intercourse be tainted with any bitter recollections.

My fear is, that the imperfection of our existing colonial relations has greatly perverted the feeling of the colonial populations. I find a proof of this in the answer I have already cited from the Canadians to our proposition for building more forts on their frontier, which answer amounted to "what have we to do with that?" (See p. 26.)

On the other hand, the necessity for correcting this evil has not yet taken hold of the public mind of England in any degree commensurate with its grave importance. Therefore, I say, borrowing Mr. Gladstone's words (*Evid.* 3,829), "we "have now so long maintained the system of providing for the "ordinary purposes of colonial defence, and even of police, by "means of a British force, and at the cost of the British ex- "chequer, that, when we take into consideration the fact that "all political modes of thought are very much connected with "habit and tradition, I am not sanguine enough to believe "that a sound state of opinion could be established in a day."

There is this advantage in the gross inequality of our present treatment of various Colonies relatively—our taking payment for military assistance from those who are willing to pay, and asking for no payment where we anticipate refusal—

that it will facilitate a gradual and occasional mode of reform—"keeping it," as Mr. Gladstone suggests (*Evid.* 3,793), "in "view, prosecuting it with great steadiness, as opportunities "shall offer, and bringing it before the attention of this "country."

The silliest mode of proceeding would be, one suggested by some, that we should wait for the colonists to express their own readiness to give up our assistance.

What my proposition would ultimately amount to would be the withdrawal of all English troops from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the West Indies, in time of peace, excepting such English troops as any of those Colonies might be allowed to take upon their own establishment temporarily; and the entire removal of all votes for colonial civil services from our own Parliamentary Estimates.

I would have the Canadian Government, in the right time and manner, informed that after a certain date, unless war were going on, they would have to provide for their own garrisons, as well as all their requisite peace establishments, as they might deem fit; and that they should be prepared to hold their own in case of foreign attack, at least till the forces of the Empire could come to their aid.

The Australians should likewise be cautioned that war alone could, after some future day, bring any more English forces to their shores; that if their gold diggers again want to drive Chinese away from a place like Lambing Flat, they must settle such a point with their own Government; or if riots recur like those of Ballarat, they must provide for their suppression. No one will complain of the withdrawal of English troops except the public-house keepers, commissariat contractors, and young ladies. (See Mr. Lowe's *Evid.* 3,410.)

In New Zealand the Imperial Government must abandon its control over Native policy; and, having laid the basis of an impartial management of affairs with reference to both races, leave the Colony to defend its own.

The South African Colonists should be prepared to lose the eighty-one English soldiers who are now supposed to hold the whole Cape Town District for them; and the Dutch boers to look after their own cattle, or not expose them to Kafir depredation. The primary responsibility for the safety of their property being thrown on them, they will not rush carelessly into war; war having arisen, they may look, as English subjects, for English help—but only for help; and England must alike abstain from voting £40,000 a year for their Governor to make experiments in civilizing Kafirs, and £400,000 a year for shooting them.

The Governors of West Indian Islands must be instructed to call on the proprietors to form their own police, no less in Trinidad, for instance, than they already do in Antigua; and to liberate English troops from a service, of which Lord Grey quotes Colonel Tulloch (*Evid.* 2,552), as saying "that "a man incurred more danger from passing one year in "Jamaica than fighting in three such battles as that of "Waterloo."

All this will require time, but should be done in time. The Select Committee, in the eleventh paragraph of their *Report*, seem to suggest the right mode of proceeding, namely that of Lord Grey in 1851, when, as Colonial Minister, he announced to the Australian Colonies his policy, without making it a subject of negotiation with them.

I say nothing of the withdrawal of troops from stations, whether held for "coaling," as the Falkland Islands, or for some indefinite object, as "calling-places *en route* for India," as St. Helena; any obstruction to our use of which in case of war, we might at the time remove more effectually than we can by all our present garrisons prevent. This is a distinct branch of my subject upon which I need not enter.

I make but one further proposition, that I would abandon all thought of expending any of the £1,000,000 which Sir John Burgoyne tells us (Appendix, *No.* 7) is required to com-

plete our colonial fortifications now in progress, excepting from his list, as not colonial, what is necessary for such places as Gibraltar, Malta, and Bermuda.

I hope I may have given, satisfactorily to your judgment, certainly at a time when the subject is most important, if not urgent, a fair comparison between our former and existing Colonial system; and strong reasons for restoring the former, all the stronger for the transitional character of our present position. Of our present system, I take my leave with Lord Grey's reflection on its salient feature (*Evid.* 2,578). "It is "the greatest blunder that can be committed, that we should "on the one hand tell the Colonists that we will be responsible "for the cost of war, and take upon ourselves the burthen of "defending them; and that, on the other hand, they should have "the power of regulating the policy which may make a war "necessary or not."

I cannot conclude without a reference to one, whose mind has furnished all the wisdom I may have collected on this subject, and to whom, if I mistake not, most of those who have the credit of the partial restoration of our colonial constitutions are greatly indebted—whose irreparable loss I have had to deplore while these lines were being written—John Robert Godley, Under-Secretary of State for War. He was what the Greeks called Œkist to the Canterbury Settlement in New Zealand, the first settlement that Englishmen have made in this century at all in the revived spirit of our early colonization. Its unchecked success and rapid growth in wealth and numbers is the best testimony to the soundness of its principle. The same testimony I call in favour of what its Founder considered to be the necessary corollary of that established principle.

I am,

Faithfully yours,

C. B. ADDERLEY.

APPENDIX.

1.—*Extracts from Evidence given before the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure by* JOHN ROBERT GODLEY, Esq., *Under-Secretary of State for War, and a Member of the Departmental Committee which reported to Parliament in* 1859, *on Military Defences.*

[Mr. GODLEY's further remarks upon the Departmental Report, in the Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee, No. 19, p. 319, are well worth reading.]

Evid. 2069. The essential principle of colonial defence, is colonial responsibility and management: the contribution of the Imperial Government, if any, should be of money only. This was the system pursued with the old American Colonies: Parliament having been in the habit of voting sums of money to compensate them for any disproportionate expenditure incurred by them in the common cause.

2070. Englishmen have never shown themselves slow in defending themselves; and, as a matter of fact, the old American Colonies, to whom the responsibility was entirely left, did successfully defend themselves, so that there was not one of them conquered during the period during which that system was pursued.

2072. The analogy between the circumstances of the old American Colonies, and those of the present day, is complete as regards this question.

2195. They had, as an immediate neighbour, a far more formidable power, for aggressive purposes, than the United States, *viz.*, the French; and on the other side, a more formidable naval and military power, the Spaniards: so that the danger to our New England Colonies from foreign aggression was infinitely greater than the danger of Canada from aggression by the United States.

2071. The plan of throwing the responsibility of defending themselves on the colonies, is the most effectual way of defending them, and they are less effectually defended by our garrisons, which are uniformly inadequate, whilst the fact of their presence renders the colonists unprepared to defend themselves. If the South Carolinians at the present time had been in the habit of trusting to a federal

garrison to defend them, they would not have taken half such vigorous or effectual measures of self-defence, as they have done.

2074. Very possibly a nucleus of British soldiers is an important element in the defence of the colonies, and if the colonies think so, they may carry such a plan into effect, provided England can spare the troops.

2099. If the colonies defrayed the cost, there would be less objection to scattering British troops over the world; but even then I should not think it a good plan; but if we could spare the troops, we might acquiesce in it, in deference to the general principle of letting the colonists settle for themselves the best way of defending themselves.

2100. It would be better for them to arm and train their own people; the main object being to throw upon them the habit and responsibility of self-defence; it is a secondary object to diminish imperial expenditure.

2115. It would depend on the colonists themselves whether their local forces should be confined to the colonies in which they are raised. In the times of the old colonies of North America, they were not so, but made war on the King's enemies in other parts of the world.

2176. The colonies undertaking the first responsibility, we should contribute our quota towards their external defences on the ground that they are involved in England's foreign policy.

2108. That is the ground of their only claim on the mother country for protection.

2177. On the other hand, England is often involved in warfare by colonial interests and relations. Within the last twenty years, we have been three or four times on the verge of war with America, upon purely colonial questions in which this country was not interested.

2076. The change I propose in the present system should be effected as Lord Grey effected his change in the plan of defending the Australian Colonies, which produced no permanent discontent. If the terms on which imperial troops would be sent were simply announced, the colonists would have to acquiesce, and in a little time they would consider it, as the old colonists did, a matter of pride and privilege to defend themselves. 2,077.

2063. The action of imperial troops in New Zealand lately has not been satisfactory to the colonists.

2164. Mr. Fitzgerald, Superintendent of Canterbury, and Prime Minister of the colony at the time, thus writes: "Government "formally declines our offer to volunteer to the Taranaki war. The "Queen's army is hanging like an incubus on the colony, doing "nothing itself, and preventing any one else."

2188. I know that all the colonists are dissatisfied with the way the war has been carried on.

2080. I think, if the English Government were to withdraw its garrisons from the forts of Quebec and Kingston, the inhabitants of Canada would undertake the defence of them.

2093. I have never seen a foreign criticism upon the power of England, without observing that the writer considered the necessity of protecting colonies all over the world, as the main element of our weakness.

2691. It appears to me, that if those stations which we keep for coaling, and refitting ships, are essential to the interests of the empire; the better plan would be, if we were stronger at sea, to occupy them when war broke out; if we were not stronger at sea, our garrisons would be ineffectual in defending them. The plan now is to scatter garrisons over the world, on the chance that they may be wanted. I should propose keeping the troops at home, and sending them to the place where they were wanted when war broke out. The Bahamas happen to be a case peculiarly in point. I find that we spend about 40,000*l.* a year on their defences: so that since the peace of 1814, we have spent nearly two millions of money, in defending the Bahamas; and during all that time, we have never had a force there that could have resisted the crews of two frigates.

2094. The circumstances of the West Indies are not such as to call for the necessity of our paying for their police, any more than for their roads, or their civil officers.

2170. I think that under any circumstances, they would prefer connexion with the English, to connexion with any other power.

2117. I do not think that the entire withdrawal of British soldiers would tend to lessen imperial feeling in any of the colonies.

2123. If any colony deliberately desired to separate from this country, it would not be desirable to retain its allegiance by force.

2.—*Extracts from Evidence given by* The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone. M.P.

3768. The greatest difficulty attached to the subject of our colonial military expenditure, is the uninformed and immature, and generally indifferent state of public opinion upon it in this country.

3780. To arrive at a system under which the primary responsibility of self-defence by land should be thrown on the colonists themselves, would be not only an immense advantage to the British Exchequer, but would have many still more important and higher recommendations, independently of the question of cost.

3781. No community which is not primarily charged with the ordinary business of its own defence is really, or can be, in the full sense of the word, a free community. The privileges of freedom, and the

burdens of freedom, are absolutely associated together: to bear the burdens is as necessary as to enjoy the privilege, in order to form that character, which is the great security of freedom itself.

3782. The system under which a colonial community itself is primarily charged with the duty of its own defence, is by far the best, both for the mother country, and for the colony itself. I mean, such a system as did exist for a great length of time in the case of the old American Colonies.

3783. They were not a bit more independent than it is extremely desirable that all our principal colonies should be.

3784. The power of making peace or war was retained by the mother country, and the primary responsibility of self-defence was borne by those colonies at a period, and under circumstances, when they were almost certain to be drawn into entirely English quarrels, and to be made directly the subject of contest among European powers.

3785. They were in a state of much less independence than Canada is now: for undoubtedly it would not have been permitted to those colonies to exercise any power of legislation adversely to the mother country; whereas, we have observed that even that power may now be exercised with a view of raising up a protected interest against the commerce of the mother country.

3787. The really valuable tie with a colony, is the moral and social tie. I cannot view any portion of the benefit resulting to England, from the connexion with Canada, as consisting in the cost of defending her. She would be just as likely to separate from us, if she thought herself unjustly involved in a British war, whether we undertook her defence or not: if her feelings are not with us, I do not think she will remain with us because we charge ourselves with the burden of her defence.

3797. In proportion as responsibilities are accepted by colonial communities, they will be more disposed to go beyond the bare idea of self-defence, and to render loyal and effective assistance in the struggles of the empire.

3798. As regards colonies generally, while England has supremacy at sea, they are safe, and the fortifications and the colonial garrisons in the West Indies, and many others, are little, if at all, required. If England has not supremacy at sea, you are only making victims of those garrisons.

3810. Napoleon kept for a great many years 8,000 men in Corfu, and that force was completely neutralized by two English sailing ships, when in the hour of his extremity, he wanted its assistance.

3814. It seems unwise continuing a system of fortifying possessions like Mauritius, which are properly to be defended by our fleet. Our present system is founded on a condition of this empire, re-

latively to other powers, which has passed away, when communication with our colonies was slow and uncertain. England is now the centre of constant, rapid, and certain communication with her colonies, and we have enormous advantages for supporting them on the principle of keeping our great mass of force at home, and supplying them as they may require.

3834. But the question is not so much of the amount of England's contribution, as of the transfer of responsibility to the colonies. I should like to see the state of feeling restored to the colonies which induced the first American colonists to make it one of their grievances that British troops were kept in their borders without their consent.

3841. The old system of American self-defence was much more favourable to that high tone of spirit and feeling than the system we have pursued since the separation of those colonies, and that not by the fault of the colonies themselves, but by the fault of what we have done for them. Although labour is scarce and dear in the colonies, yet I doubt very much whether there has ever existed any country where labour was too dear for self-defence, if only the community had right ideas on the subject, and had not somebody else ready to undertake it for them.

3867. The colonists of former times were not allowed an independent existence as regards the full exercise of their own industry, but we now grant absolute commercial freedom, and that, of course, is a consideration which greatly increases the strength of the argument for their assuming, with the benefits of freedom, the burdens of freedom also.

3828, 3873. The principles of our old colonial system do not tend to separation, but are powerfully conducive to keeping up connexion. It required a course of great harshness and obstinacy in us to effect American separation.

3.—*Extracts taken from the Evidence given by* The Right. Hon. Robert Lowe, M.P., *who was a Member of the Legislative Council of New South Wales from* 1843 *to* 1849.

3330-1. I do not think it desirable to retain any troops at all in New South Wales. A Government of that kind is not fit to be trusted with the disposition of Her Majesty's troops for any purpose whatever.

3331. It seems to me that the people of this country ought not to be taxed for maintaining the external defence or internal police of the Australian Colonies in time of peace.

3332. Situate in a temperate latitude, inhabited by Englishmen and Irishmen, and under institutions in which they can govern themselves, they can defend themselves from internal riot, and from such

insults from foreign nations as no country can be wholly secure from. As regards receiving payment from them for military assistance, it appears to me to be unworthy of the dignity of this country to take money from some colonies because they are willing to pay it, and not from others because they are unwilling to pay it. I object to payment altogether; it is putting our troops in the position of mercenaries.

3333. For every purpose, for prestige as well as defence, imperial troops are better out of the way.

3334. A colony which is ill-disposed to this country is not worth retaining. If it succeed in the struggle, it would have been better not to have attempted to coerce it; if it fail, a colony re-conquered, wasted, and embittered, would be a worthless possession.

3335. The question is the reverse of that of last century,—whether the people of the United Kingdom should be taxed for the benefit of the people of its dependencies? When I lived at Sydney, there was no income-tax, nor assessed taxes, nor excise, except on spirits, which probably was a benefit rather than a burden. Profits were large, wages very high. The mildness of the climate renders fuel almost unnecessary except for cooking, and enables people to do with little clothing. To tax the labourers of Leicestershire and Dorsetshire to relieve such a community from a taxation required for its own defence, is a crying injustice.

By their connexion with the mother country the colonists lose the power of making war and peace, but the advantages they gain by being part of the British empire are enormous; they are relieved from the necessity of keeping up a large force at any time on land, or any at sea, and no people enjoy more security in time of war, and by the guarantee of this country against war they are enabled to apply their revenues entirely to their own local purposes.

3336. It is ridiculous to suppose that the troops we can spare in time of peace would be a defence to Australia, and it is more ridiculous to suppose that the troops we can spare in time of war would be sufficient. The present conditions of war are such that we must recall our troops to defend ourselves at home. The changes introduced into warfare render this island more liable to invasion than before. Our troops can do little to defend Australian Colonies, but they rely upon their presence almost as much as if they were a sufficient guard; and it has prevented them, till within two years, from drilling their own men, and from enrolling sufficient militia or volunteers. Strange we should send people from England to defend the Antipodes, while we leave the young men of Australia to grow up without the knowledge of arms.

3337. The motives which induce our colonists to remain united to the mother country, are sufficiently overwhelming, without our fur-

nishing a force for their defence and police, which they are perfectly well able to pay for themselves.

3340. Their being subject to our foreign policy gives the colonies fair ground to ask for assistance in times of war.

3343. Of course a large military expenditure is a popular thing in a colony. Even a war in a remote part of the colony will be popular in parts where it is not carried on, on account of the money which is made out of it. The country may suffer, but the towns often get a great advantage. It is great imprudence on the part of the Imperial Government to place the power of commencing wars, in which it will be obliged to take part, in the hands of persons over whom it has no control, but who are often directly interested in getting up a war.

So long as the wars they commence must be fought out at the expense of the mother country, there will always be war when there is a pretext.

3356. To this pecuniary advantage there are many countervailing evils to the colonies, who, as young nations, are educated in a one-sided manner, and may be reduced to the condition in which the Romans left the Britons at the mercy of the Picts and Scots.

3359. The Australians, were they trained, would make as fine soldiers as any in the world. Their volunteers originated from the parent movement in England. There will be plenty to volunteer; no people better mounted; they make excellent sailors, and are full of spirit. Their particular industry is favourable for volunteering.

3385. I have no doubt there is a spirit of self-defence in the people of Australia, and that when they understand that they must rely upon themselves, they will defend themselves.

3405. The small forces we send afford no protection, deaden the spirit of the colonists, and every soldier sent probably prevents a hundred colonists from taking arms and drilling.

3368, 3371. The more extensive and exposed the frontier, the more danger in deluding the colony, by the presence of a few imperial troops.

3376. Better keep even the nucleus of British aid in England.

3346. I have seen what expenditure on fortifications is in New South Wales, where, after an enormous waste of English money, Sydney was left utterly defenceless.

3388. The entire withdrawal of English troops from Australia, would not tend to separation.

3390. The troops involve the Imperial Government in the unpopularity of the Local Government; and (3402) offer to demagogues a ready means of committing the colony by an insult on that sign and symbol of imperial pre-eminence and protection.

4.—*Extract taken from the Evidence given by* Lord Herbert, *Secretary of State for War.*

3501. Whenever there is an imperial necessity to concentrate troops on any point, the rest of the colonies are starved, without reference to their wants at the time. In the Russian war, we denuded the colonies of troops.

3512. Canada has within itself a considerable element of *personnel* for its own defence; and I think you may look forward to the time, when the necessity for sending troops there may cease, or, at all events, be greatly diminished.

3511. They have now a considerable force of volunteers.

3558. The great fortresses, such as Malta and Gibraltar, I should garrison to the utmost. I think the difference between peace and war, in many of the colonies, would be that, instead of maintaining a force in them in time of war, we should withdraw it. I see no use in maintaining isolated battalions: either we have the supremacy of the sea, in which case they are useless, or, we lose the supremacy of the sea, in which case they are caught in a trap.

3563-5. To make colonies contribute to their own defences, we must say, "you shall have very small garrisons." We should get the worst of bargains with them.

3577. If all our colonies could have been founded upon the Indian (*i.e.* self-paying) principle, it would have been of great advantage.

3579. The control it would give the colonial authorities of the troops, would be no serious disadvantage, such as limiting the operations of a ship to a colony would be. So long as the troops remain, the colony pays; when they are withdrawn, the colony ceases to pay for them.

3599. I should spend as little as possible upon fortifications abroad, and strengthen our fortifications at home.

3630. The principle of keeping a small body of troops in a colony, by way of representing imperial power, is a sentimental view, to which I attach no importance.

3639. If you maintain a large garrison, you give colonists an excellent excuse for not raising any militia of their own.

2529. The total cost of transport to and from the colonies amounted in 1859 to 200,000*l*. It would be a great advantage if that could be saved by the formation of local corps.

3546-7. Sir William Denison, in his despatches, August 1856, has recommended that a colony should be left to bear the primary responsibility of its own defence, and that the mother country should

only assist. The principle therein enunciated is certainly a principle to be aimed at.

3552. The necessity for the distribution of our force in the last few years is much altered. I should accumulate all the forces that it is possible to accumulate at home, and keep as few men as possible in the colonies.

5.—*Extracts taken from the Evidence given by* General Sir John Burgoyne, *Inspector General of Fortifications, showing inefficiency of our present System.*

1254. We ought to maintain in strength, besides Mediterranean garrisons, principally Mauritius, Bermuda (1,339), Kingston, Quebec, and Halifax; and secondarily, the Cape, Ceylon, Hong-Kong, and St. Helena; and for coaling stations (1,254), Aden, Seychelles, and the Falkland Islands.

1255. There are works at all these stations now, but most of them are quite incomplete and inefficient.

1256. The estimated cost of works at Mauritius is 202,000*l.*, but the advance of military science will require great additions. The whole islands should be surrounded with forts (1,257, 1,264), of which necessarily the erection and defence must be at the cost of the Imperial Exchequer.

1275. About 6,000 troops would be necessary to defend the island.

1313. 26,000*l.* has been voted for a citadel at Halifax. This vote was on a calculation made twenty years ago, and is not sufficient.

1319 and 1379. Those places which have large British population should organize a volunteer defence.

1326. They should protect themselves.

1336. The presence of British troops discourages local efforts for defence.

1330, 1351. If the colonists are indifferent, our garrison could not defend Halifax or Canada.

1409-10. The coal mines of Cape Breton require defence against a possible enemy's cruiser, which defence should devolve on the colonists.

1410, 1412. The miners have formed a volunteer corps of 200 or 300 among themselves.

1459. 20,000*l.* is estimated to be necessary for improving the defences of St. Helena.

1472. We ought to have 5,000 or 6,000 men to defend Cape Town. There are only 81 at present defending that whole district.

1471. The troops are up the country.

Appendix No. 7, p. 281. Rough estimate of the cost of completing works in progress, and of new works necessary to place named foreign possessions in a reasonable state of defence, in addition to sums in estimates 1861-2, and exclusive of armaments and barracks and of such occasional improvements as art and science may from time to time render necessary—1,000,000*l.*; of which only 100,000*l.* is for Gibraltar and Malta.